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# THESIS

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE  
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ASSISTANT PROGRAM

by

Martin Gilbert Kloster

December 1981

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The conclusions identify actual and perceived weaknesses in the recruitment and utilization phases of implementing the program. Recommendations are provided.





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The Implementation of the  
Counterintelligence Assistant Program

by

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requirements for the degree of

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## ABSTRACT

The implementation of a new program within the Army's Military Intelligence Branch, the enlisted Counterintelligence career management field, is described. The creation of the duty position Counterintelligence Assistant represents a major change to the field through the introduction of an entry skill level which did not previously exist. This change was primarily a result of a chronic shortage of personnel which found skill level two filled at only 30 per cent of authorized strength as of March 1981.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

### A. FOUNDATION FOR OBJECTIVES

The Army's Military Intelligence Branch has undergone several major changes in recent years. These changes have resulted in identification of new tasks and goals, incorporation of advanced technological equipment and procedures, and restructuring of units through activation, deactivation and consolidation. This thesis concentrates on a major change that was recently implemented in the enlisted career management field of Counterintelligence Agent. Specifically, the change involves the introduction of an entry skill level to the Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 97B which was not previously present in the career management field. Prior to this planned change, Counterintelligence Agents were required to have completed two years of service prior to application for Counterintelligence training, and to have attained the age of 21 prior to graduating from the Counterintelligence course. These personnel normally entered the Counterintelligence field at skill level two.

The introduction of an entry skill level resulted from a chronic shortage of Counterintelligence personnel, primarily in the junior enlisted grades. In March 1981, the shortage had become so severe that only 30 per cent of skill level two positions were filled. This inadequate fill of



personnel was a direct result of insufficient recruitment of in-service personnel. Additionally, a military study indicated an increased need for Counterintelligence support in tactical units, predominantly in the area of Operations Security. It was hypothesized that Operations Security and tactical Counterintelligence support could be accomplished by personnel who did not have the experience or the maturity of the existing Counterintelligence Agents. Therefore, the Counterintelligence Assistant program was designed and implemented. Although this appears to be strictly a structural modification based on personnel shortages and a task change, the impact on other parts of the system cannot be ignored. The secondary and tertiary consequences of any change must be considered to prevent unforeseen circumstances from cancelling the primary desired effects [Ref 1: p. 9].

## B. OBJECTIVES

The objectives are:

1. To determine if the needs and expectations of individuals enlisting for the MOS are being met in the recruitment phase;
2. To identify incongruencies in formal and unit training;
3. To determine if unit commanders are utilizing the Counterintelligence Assistants in a manner that is consistent with the Army Regulation;
4. To identify the initial job satisfaction and potential for reenlistment of Counterintelligence Assistants assigned to units.



## C. METHODOLOGY

The data collection phase included obtaining historical and current literature on the Counterintelligence Assistant program from Department of the Army agencies and staffs, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, United States Army Forces Command and the United States Army Intelligence Center and School. Literature research also encompassed current organizational development applications, and major studies previously conducted on related subjects.

Data was also collected through personal and telephonic interviews with recruiter personnel at local recruiting stations, a United States Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Station, a District Recruiting Command Headquarters and the United States Army Recruiting Command.

A questionnaire was developed specifically for Counterintelligence Assistants, and distributed to personnel who were assigned to units following formal training. Development of the questionnaire included research on preparation of questions, interviews with Counterintelligence Assistants to gain an insight on terminology and the processes of the program, and collaboration with a Naval Postgraduate School Professor who is recognized as an authority in questionnaire development and design. Because the Counterintelligence Assistant program is relatively new, the population currently assigned to the field is small. Therefore, the





entire population was included in the survey. More detailed information on interview methodology and the design, administration and feedback of the questionnaire is contained in Appendix A. A copy of the questionnaire and results are contained in Appendix B, although specific references to portions of the data are contained in Chapters IV and V. Respondents to the questionnaire were provided anonymity in order to encourage frank and open responses.

Personal interviews with Counterintelligence Assistants, their supervisors and commanders were conducted at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Fort Hood, Texas; and Fort Ord, California. These installations were selected because of the high density of Counterintelligence Assistants in comparison to other locations. Personal interviews were also conducted with staff and faculty members at the United States Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, Arizona. Interviews were also conducted with students enrolled in the Counterintelligence Assistant course at Fort Huachuca.

Personal observations were also made of Counterintelligence Assistants involved with daily activities in their units, and of classes presented to student personnel at the United States Army Intelligence Center and School.



#### D. LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS

Although the Counterintelligence Assistant program is nearing maturity, there are revisions anticipated or in progress within the Counterintelligence field. These changes, which will have varying degrees of impact on the program, include modification of the Counterintelligence Assistant training and subsequent Counterintelligence courses and the publication of the Soldier's Manual for the entry skill level. Additionally, a review and possible revision in doctrine is currently under study, and actions to alter units' Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTO&E) and Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) is pending for Counterintelligence positions. When appropriate, reference to these pending and potential changes will be made to insure clarity of the existing situation.

It is assumed that the readers of this thesis have a basic understanding of the Army's Military Intelligence Branch and, specifically, the Counterintelligence career management field.

#### E. APPROACH

Chapter I has presented the need and objectives for this study. Additionally, the methodology used in accomplishing the research, and the limitations and assumptions, have been identified. Progression toward the objectives will proceed in succeeding chapters.



Chapter II relates the applicability of the organizational development process to a change in a complex organization. A model is constructed in this chapter which provides the basis for examining the change that has been implemented in the Counterintelligence field from a total systems perspective.

Chapter III provides factors and considerations that led to a felt need for change in the existing Counterintelligence program. A review of the intended implementation design will be provided, concentrating on the areas of recruitment, formal training, utilization in the field and career progression. This chapter provides the background, major considerations and differences which were applied in implementing an innovative change, and facilitates diagnosis of the actual implementation.

Chapter IV addresses the recruitment and formal training programs as they evolved from the change process. The model identified in Chapter II is applied as a diagnostic tool in assessing these phases of the program, and the input from recruiter personnel and Counterintelligence Assistants is analyzed.

Chapter V presents the actual employment of Counterintelligence Assistants in the field, and identifies the compatibility of commander's utilization with the intent of the Army Regulation. Additionally, the views and perceptions of commanders, supervisors and Counterintelligence



Assistants concerning satisfaction with the MOS are presented, and an indication of retention potential within the Counterintelligence field is analyzed.

Chapter VI provides a brief summary of conclusions, as well as recommendations for interventions which will provide direction toward improving the overall effectiveness of the Counterintelligence Assistant program within the Army's Military Intelligence Branch.





## II. AN ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT APPROACH TO PLANNED CHANGE

### A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides a brief background of organizational development, and how it can be applied to a planned change within a complex organization. Additionally, a conceptual model consisting of six components is developed, with a definition of each component. This model serves as a diagnostic lens to review the implementation of the Counterintelligence Assistant program, and is employed implicitly in Chapters IV, V, and VI to present perceived and potential problems, and provide recommendations.

### B. APPLICABILITY OF ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Organizational development has evolved from a series of management techniques applied throughout the twentieth century. In 1900 Fredrick Taylor conducted work in the area of scientific management which concentrated on productivity and making work more efficient within an organization. During this period, the majority of the workers were poorly educated, accustomed to obeying orders without question, and were deeply concerned with job security and survival [Ref. 2: p. 10]. In the 1920's the classical management style was dominant, and emphasized how to organize for work,



and focused a great deal on organizational structure. Max Weber's legal/bureaucratic model was at the forefront during this era, and his philosophy was that in order to dominate a large number of people, the followers must be made to feel obligated to obey the orders of superiors. The legal domination was the primary basis for control, and followers obeyed because they accepted the law and the procedure [Ref. 3: p. 76].

Various management models were employed through the 1930s and 1940s, including the human relations management technique which was oriented toward people, and followed the advent of labor unions and the depression. A closely related concept, which was a result of the human relations management theory, was the concept of participative management. This management theory subscribed that personnel in an organization must be committed to and supportive of the organizational goals.

The functional management model was also popular in this time period, and concentrated on the processes involved with work. The basic premise of the functional management technique was that work can be separated into distinct functions within an organization. Once these functions had been identified, groups were formed which performed similar tasks. During World War II, the management science models appeared, and were centered primarily on the analytical methods.



Management science was technically oriented and included such methods as Program Evaluation and Review Techniques (PERT). In the 1950s the social technical systems of management came to the forefront and considered not only the analytical aspects, but also included the behavior science implications in applying management techniques. It is from this area that organizational development had its inception.

Organizational development has expanded vastly in the last thirty years. This has predominantly been a result of the accelerated changes occurring in technology, communications, politics, social values and institutional dimensions of our society. People are more educated, and less concerned with job security and survival. Major changes in social values have also resulted in personnel who are more likely to challenge or question rules and policies rather than blindly obey them. An organization can no longer cling to the prior mechanism of economic contracting for recruiting, motivating or retaining workers. Duty positions that do not provide a challenge, or organizations that poorly communicate goals and objectives, may fail to gain a worker's commitment, resulting in personnel investing less of themselves in their jobs and the organization [Ref. 4: p. 3]. Using a systems approach, organizational development has grown in response to a need from organizations for survival and viability in a rapidly changing world. This



systems approach examines the facets of an organization that were previously looked upon as separate entities, and views these same parts on the premise that there are relationships between them. In the past, managers in civilian or military organizations may have been able to look solely at the relationships between task and structure with success. However, today's managers must view a change in any part of the organization with a concern as to how it will affect all other parts.

Large corporations and the military services have recognized the applicability of organizational development, and have devoted extensive resources to furthering their programs. Organizational development can therefore be applied not only in smaller organizations, which may have an organic structure, but can and is being applied in large, complex, bureaucratic organizations, such as the military, which are predominantly mechanistic.

Organizational development is an effort which involves a planned change that is organization-wide and managed from the top. The purpose of the change is to increase the organization's effectiveness through planned interventions in the organization's processes, using the knowledge of behavioral science [Ref. 5: p. 9]. An organizational change process may vary in size and complexity as well as time from onset to completion. Normally, in a large bureaucratic





organization, a change evolves over a period of several years, and experiences a settling-in period when the change is modified to gain congruence within the organization. Organizational development also has as a major theme that a change undertaken is not only congruent with all components of the organization, but also receives the commitment of the personnel in the organization. One process that is critical to gaining this commitment is that of communication.

In a bureaucracy, communication is based primarily on a vertical top-down process. However, informal lateral and bottom-up networks can exist. Accurately relaying the intended goals, objectives and processes involved in a change can greatly facilitate commitment building by linking the top management with the eventual users or implementers of the change. If commitment is not obtained, resistance to change may occur. All organizations have a natural tendency to resist change to some degree, and coping with this instinctive behavior is extremely difficult. Two specific types of resistance may be experienced in an organization: individual or personal resistance and organizational forms of resistance. Organizational resistance is considered to be the most prevalent in a bureaucratic organization [Ref. 6: pp. 31-55].

A change in a complex organization generally will contain several elements to include:



1. Diagnosing the present situation, including the need for change;
2. Setting goals and defining the desired state after the change;
3. Defining the transition state between the present and future;
4. Developing strategies and action plans for managing the transition;
5. Evaluating the change effort;
6. Stabilizing the new condition and obtaining a balance between stability and flexibility [Ref. 7: p. 16].

A planned change, such as the implementation of the Counterintelligence Assistant program, normally comprises a one-time structural and functional modification which has defined boundaries for achieving the steady state. Additionally, two conditions must be met before a change can be effectively managed. First, the leadership of the organization must be aware of the need for change, and secondly, the desired end state must be clear. Furthermore, analysis of the organization's subsystems is an implicit consideration which should be included to insure that the total organization is ready for the planned change.

As with any change effort, there is a cost involved. Therefore, the total investment will have to be compared to the organization's capability to accept the change. A change will occur only when the costs are outweighed by a number of factors which can create a positive motivation toward the change. David Gleicher developed a change



formula which expresses the factors associated with the cost of change:

$$C = (ABD) > X$$

where C is the change, A is the level of dissatisfaction with the current situation, B is the clear desired end state, D is the practical first step toward the desired state, and X is the cost of the change. The premise of this formula is that if sufficient dissatisfaction with the status quo does not exist, and the subsystems involved in the planned change are not informed of and provided clear goals concerning the change, the cost will be too high to affect the change successfully [Ref 1: pp. 25-26 and Ref. 4: p. 46]. Additionally, each subsystem needs some degree of awareness of the methods to be employed in attaining the first steps toward the desired state. If this is not accomplished, little, if any, movement may occur, and the change may reach an early demise. The process of communication is an integral part of determining the degree of dissatisfaction with the status quo, insuring that the subsystems are informed of the goals and providing information on the first steps involved in reaching the desired state. This communication serves as a link in gaining commitment and obtaining feedback on the problems associated with the change and any modifications that may be needed.




### C. A CONCEPTUAL MODEL

The total systems approach of organizational development is enhanced by using a diagnostic tool when viewing complex organizations. The use of such a diagnostic aid facilitates a systematic process of defining problems, developing primary and alternate solutions, and implementing and evaluating change. A model provides the mechanism for accomplishing these actions, and lends order to the analysis. There are several models available with which organizations can be viewed. However, one model that has been consistently used by the researcher, and has wide acceptance in organizational development, is the Leavitt diamond [Ref. 1: p. 9 and Ref. 8: p. 56]. Figure 1 provides a modified version of the Leavitt diamond, which was used in collecting and analyzing data on the Counterintelligence Assistant program. The components contained in the model include: environment, structure, technology, people, tasks/goals, and communication. Because of its interrelationship with a planned change, communications was added to the core of the Leavitt diamond.

The environment refers to the forces that are external to the organization, and often have a powerful influence on the direction taken by an organization. No organization is immune to its environment, and the military is no exception. Outside agencies and individuals provide opportunities and impose constraints which impact on the military, and thus affect activities within the organization. The values and







MODIFIED LEAVITT DIAMOND

A modified Leavitt Diamond showing how organizations should be viewed as complex systems consisting of mutually independent components.

Figure 1



attitudes of society have made dynamic changes in recent years, and have a direct bearing on the way the public views the military. The environment also has a major and lasting effect on resources made available to the military in terms of political processes and, perhaps the most critical resource of any organization, the human resources that become part of the organization. With the termination of the draft, the military was faced with having the authority to recruit personnel for the service, but more than ever the social values and attitudes of people entering the service had to be taken into consideration. Failure to take these factors into consideration would have soon found the military with the inability to recruit or retain personnel. As previously cited, the bureaucratic organization can no longer rely on purely economic motives for personnel joining or remaining with an organization.

Structure refers to those elements that describe an organization's relationships between its subunits. These are systems which have been designed to regulate the actions of an organization, and represent the organizational rather than individual characteristics. Elements included in structure are the number of levels of hierarchy, organization size, job structure, centralized or decentralized management, staff relations and evaluation systems. The structure of an organization provides the composition of the organization, describing how it will be organized for



work, denoting how and by whom the work will be accomplished, and defining the chain of responsibility.

Technology is the component that not only implies highly sophisticated equipment such as word processors and computers, but includes those methodologies made available to and employed by an organization to accomplish tasks. Thus, technology refers to the ways in which an organization solves problems, either with highly technical equipment and systems design, or through individual and group expertise and innovation. The impact of technology is not confined to large corporations, but has also resulted in the military modifying its traditional managerial systems in order to adapt to changes. And as a result, the military, like many other large and complex organizations, has become more dependent upon the knowledge and skills of specialists [Ref. 9: p. 475].

The tasks and goals component of the model have been combined, although they are separate and distinct entities. Tasks are normally considered as specific assignments of work given to an individual or unit by another organizational subunit. Tasks can either be formal, with structured conditions and standards such as those required in a soldier's Skill Qualification Test (SQT), or informal tasks which are implied or presented verbally. Normally, multiple tasks are presented in the form of job descriptions for soldiers. However, some of the tasks, notably those with



implied functions, often require basic skills which must be mastered prior to the accomplishment of the more complex tasks.

The goals applied to this model refer to organizational rather than individual goals. Goals are usually formally and explicitly expressed, and describe a desired state of an organization at a future point in time. The goals of an organization can be realized by accomplishing a front-end assessment to determine those actions and intermediate steps which must be completed to reach the desired end state. These intermediate steps are objectives which provide direction and allow the ultimate goal to be reached.

People are the basic resource of any organization. Without reservation, one of the most significant elements in organizational development theory is that which deals with the behavior and attitudes of the personnel working in the organization. Although the human resources are the most basic, they are extremely complex. And when people join an organization and are formed into groups, their complexity increases. In the early 1900s, people's needs were very basic and centered on physiological and safety needs. In today's world, individuals are able to focus on higher level needs such as achievement, recognition and self-actualization. Managers must be aware of these changing wants by personnel, to insure the organizational goals are achieved. Elements of this component include, but are not





limited to, personal needs, expectations, abilities, attitudes, morale, motivation, job satisfaction, training programs and reward systems. Unless managers take these and other variables into consideration, the overall accomplishment of an organization's mission may be adversely affected.

The component that has been added to the core of the diamond is communication. This element serves as the central thread which ties the model together. All organizations have an established communication system for transfer of information. Historical records and literature are abundant with examples of effective and ineffective communication networks. The importance of communication to an organization cannot be overemphasized. The vertical chain is the primary organization system in military organizations. A breakdown in this system at any level will usually result in problems in one or all of the components.

#### D. SUMMARY

Organizational development has applications in the civilian and military sectors which have clearly gained rapid acceptance. The use of a model, such as the one presented in this chapter, serves as a valuable diagnostic aid in viewing the entire system for effects, even though the change may appear to be a modest one with impact in only one component.



### III. THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ASSISTANT PROGRAM

#### A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides the background information necessary for beginning the diagnosis of the implementation of the Counterintelligence (CI) Assistant program, employing the conceptual model developed in Chapter II. The need for CI Assistants, and the initiation and intended implementation of the 97B10 program, will be presented, with a review of the recruiting, formal training, use in the field, and career progression of CI Assistants.

#### B. A NEED FOR CHANGE

In 1973 there were 883 CI Agents in the grades of E5 and E6 on active duty. With the end of the Vietnam conflict, and the subsequent termination of the draft, the number of CI Agents authorized on active duty was reduced and one means of obtaining CI Agents was ended. During the draft years, some CI Agents were obtained by screening drafted personnel who met the qualifications for the career field. In 1976 another potential source of CI Agents, the Military Intelligence Coordinator (97D) MOS, was terminated. These personnel served in administrative capacities within Military Intelligence (MI) organizations, and frequently transferred into the 97B MOS. From 1976 to the advent of the CI



Assistant program, the primary means of recruiting personnel into the CI Agent field was through the in-service recruitment program.

The in-service recruitment program is not formally structured, and no Major Command (MACOM) is tasked with overall responsibility for the program [Ref. 10]. Additionally, the program is not designed as an active recruitment process, but rather a passive approach consisting primarily of providing information on the 97B MOS, and providing assistance in completing an application packet. Recruitment of in-service personnel is not a primary function of an intelligence organization, but constitutes an additional responsibility. The means of providing information to prospective applicants varies, but includes notices in bulletins, word-of-mouth, briefings at installation level, notices to personnel in over-strength MOSs from their servicing Military Personnel Center Branch, and other means. Recruitment of in-service personnel normally occurs at or near the end of the first enlistment, and requires an extensive process involving an interview and recommendation by a CI Agent, completion of a biographic essay, and other administrative requirements. The completed packet is then forwarded and a formal board adjudicates each application. Those favorably considered may then attend the 97B20 CI Agent course at the United States Army Intelligence Center and School (USAICS). Personnel recruited are required to




meet the requirement of two years of active duty service and attain the age of 21 years prior to completing the course. Additionally, these personnel normally must re-enlist for 97B in order to meet the requirement of sufficient time in-service remaining after completion of the CI Agent course. The average approval rate for applicants for fiscal years 1978 through 1980 was 54.4 per cent.

The relatively low approval rate of in-service recruits, when combined with the deletion of the 97D MOS and the termination of the draft, caused a shortfall in CI personnel, and resulted in units operating well below their 97B authorizations for an extended period. Prior to 1980, the Active Army was operating at approximately 77 per cent of authorized strength in the 97B MOS. Figure 2 depicts the declining strength of 97B personnel in the normal entry level (E5) from 1972 to 1980. In March of 1981, 43 97B personnel in the grade of E5 were on active duty. The total authorization for this grade was 143, putting the grade at 30 per cent of authorized fill. The grade of E6 was at 65 per cent fill, and the grade of E7 was at 68 per cent fill.

Prior to 1975, most of the CI tasks and duties centered around what has been termed the more traditional CI activities. However, an Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study (IOSS) identified more tactically oriented CI duties, primarily in the area of Operations Security (OPSEC) support. This study led to major reorganization efforts in MI







STRENGTH OF ACTIVE ARMY E5-97B PERSONNEL

----- Authorized positions for fiscal year 1981

\* Fiscal years 1972 through 1975 ended 30 June. Fiscal years 1976 through 1980 ended 30 September.

Figure 2



units, with increased CI support to tactical units, both in garrison and in the field. This increased emphasis and the requirements for support in the area of OPSEC highlighted the manpower constraints in CI positions, particularly in tactical MI units.

As a concerted effort to improve the OPSEC posture of tactical units, the United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) submitted a proposal in September 1978 to eliminate the requirements of 21 years of age and two years prior service before an individual could enter the CI field. These recommendations were based on the manpower shortages, and the premise that the nature of OPSEC support does not require the same degree of maturity, experience or the investigative skill needed in a CI Agent. It was further recommended that an entry level skill of MOS 97B10 be established, with a program of instruction (POI) modified to train more in OPSEC techniques, with omission of investigative methods and special operations training. These Tactical OPSEC or CI Specialists, as they were first named, would be assigned to tactical MI units. After two years, they would return for training in the more traditional non-tactical CI skills. It was recognized that the potential effectiveness of an E3 or E4 OPSEC advisor dealing with a supported unit commander or his staff might be hampered, due to a lack of Army experience. Therefore, the CI Specialist would be paired with a senior CI noncommissioned officer.



As a member of a CI team, it was felt the disadvantage could be minimized. The proposal also included changes in unit structure which would allow approximately 20 per cent of the tactical 97B positions to be redesignated as 97B10 positions [Ref. 12].

This proposal was the first step in bringing about the CI Assistant program, and would result in a major change within the complex organization of the United States Army. The proposal would undergo some modifications, but the central theme would remain as the nucleus of the program.

#### C. IMPLEMENTATION DESIGN

The proposal submitted by FORSCOM was favorably considered, and in March 1979 the United States Army Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN) staffed a proposal to the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), the United States Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) and FORSCOM that closely paralleled the initial recommendation by FORSCOM [Ref. 13]. Prior to this, several other offices and agencies had been involved with coordination of the proposed action, and a study was completed by the United States Soldier Support Center to determine the feasibility of restructuring the MOS 97B. This study concurred that the two major considerations which contributed to the manpower decline in the 97B MOS were the age requirement and the prior service requirement, and further agreed



that a means of obtaining personnel other than in-service recruitment was needed. At the completion of the study, meetings were conducted with representatives from MILPERCEN, Professional Development, and the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (who favored the restructuring action prior to the study) to determine the job description and map the career pattern of 97B10s.

In May 1980, a letter of notification was distributed to the field by MILPERCEN. This letter announced the forthcoming revision to the MOS 97B, and stated that guidance would be published in Change 15 to Army Regulation (AR) 611-201 (Enlisted Career Management Fields and Military Occupational Specialties), effective 1 March 1981. The letter, provided for planning purposes only, also included major features of the change and examples of MTOE revisions [Ref. 14].

#### 1. Recruitment

The authorization to begin recruitment was effected in May 1979, under the delayed entry program. The first year's authorization was 459 personnel. The information on the 97B MOS was to be distributed through normal distribution channels. Because it was a new MOS skill level, and the first attempt at recruiting personnel off-the-street, a job description for 97B10 was published in the ACSIGRAM, with copies of this article to be forwarded to INSCOM, the United





States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) and USAICS for publication in their respective command journals and magazines.

The procedure which took an individual from civilian status through enlistment and ultimately to the 97B10 MOS would usually be initiated with a station recruiter whose primary function would be to "sell" the Army, but not a specific MOS. After completing the administrative requirements for an enlistment packet at the recruiting station, the individual would discuss potential MOS positions with a guidance counselor at the Armed Forces Entrance and Examining Station (AFEES). Once MOSs that are open and for which the individual qualifies are identified, the guidance counselor would assist the individual in selecting a MOS. After the job descriptions and options in the MOSs have been provided to the individual, a selection would be made and an enlistment contract prepared. The contract, signed by the enlistee, would include such items as the number of years of service incurred, the MOS and course of instruction for which the individual has enlisted, and any constraints which might prevent the individual from being awarded the MOS, such as failure to meet the requirements for access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). Upon completion of the enlistment process, the soldier would then attend Basic Combat Training (BCT). Initial security screening would be accomplished at the AFEES, and bioscreening, by CI Agents from the 902d MI Group, would be accomplished at BCT. The



902d personnel would interview soldiers to determine their suitability for the MOS 97B, and obtain biographic essays. Soldiers would be permitted to enter the training at USAICS based on a favorable National Agency Check (NAC), and favorable adjudication of the bioscreening by the Central Clearance Facility (CCF). Additionally, personnel would need to meet the requirements for access to SCI prior to being accepted into the 97B MOS.

## 2. Formal Training

After completion of BCT and the security clearance requirements, soldiers would enter the 97B10 Course. Initially, the length of this course was estimated at six to eight weeks, with the first course to be offered in July 1980. The course length was later adjusted to eleven weeks, with the first class scheduled to begin in March 1981, following a front-end analysis by USAICS [Ref. 15]. This analysis was to review the tasks a CI Assistant would be required to accomplish in a tactical unit, and facilitate structuring the course to meet the soldier's and unit's needs.

The 97B10 course was to concentrate on those tasks required for tactical CI and OPSEC support. Subject matter that involved investigative duties and special operations would be omitted, since the 97B10s would not meet the age requirement for investigative duties [Ref. 16]. Additionally, CI Assistants would not be issued badges and credentials



until they had completed the 97B20 course. The possible misutilization of 97B10s in an investigative role was of concern to USAICS, and correspondence was submitted through TRADOC to MILPERCEN indicating that the job description should be stated so as to prevent possible misinterpretation. Also, the initial job description closely paralleled the 97D MOS, and concern was expressed that clarification was needed to prevent the erroneous belief that the 97B10 was a rebirth of the 97D MOS [Ref. 17]. These adjustments were applied to the job description published in Change 15 to AR 611-201.

The 97B10 course was to consist of 424 hours, 330 hours dedicated to academic subjects to be taught during the eleven week course. The majority of the instruction would cover CI related tasks such as personnel, physical and document security, inspections, surveys, OPSEC, real world threat, and preparation of supporting documents and plans. Since the 97B10s were off-the-street recruits, instruction in supporting skills was also programmed. Subjects to be included in this area were weather and terrain analysis, intelligence preparation of the battlefield, United States Army structure and doctrine, tactical communications, and other topics which would enable the soldiers to more effectively accomplish CI tasks.



### 3. Utilization in the Field

Once the formal training at USAICS was completed, the 97B10s would be assigned to tactical units in the United States and overseas commands. The initial assignment would be made by the Advanced Individual Training (AIT) branch, with subsequent assignments being made by MI Branch. Individuals who were 18 years of age, and thus would have a three-year probation period, would be primary candidates for an overseas assignment. Individuals who were 20 or older would be considered for state-side assignments as their first tour.

Since upon graduation of the first classes of CI Assistants, 97B10 positions would not yet exist in unit MTOE or TDA documents, assignments to tactical units would be based on authorized 97B20 positions. Department of the Army Circular 611-82 (Personnel Selection and Classification, Implementation of Change 15 to AR 611-201) contained guidance on regrading organizations to conform to the revised addition of an entry level. These changes were to be submitted through the Vertical Army Authorization Document System (VTAADS) during the period 1 through 23 March 1981 [Ref. 18]. Once this input had been incorporated into existing documents, assignments of 97B10 personnel would be made on a position authorized basis.

The CI Assistants would work with more experienced CI Agents in an apprentice role. The primary function of





the 97B10 would be to assist and participate in tactical non-investigative CI and OPSEC duties. These would include assisting in determining enemy intelligence collection assets, organization, composition, personnel, methods of operation, capabilities, vulnerabilities, limitations and missions. Additional operations in which the 97B10 would provide assistance included evaluating sources of information, typing reports and summaries, preparing interrogation rooms, disseminating intelligence reports, and storing, inventorying and controlling classified documents [Ref. 19].

It was recognized that a 97B10 would be lacking in experience and knowledge of tactical unit functions, and the support required, and therefore would operate most effectively as a member of a team in providing OPSEC and other tactical CI services. The senior member of a team would be a more experienced CI Agent who could supervise the CI Assistant and provide the necessary guidance and instruction to enhance the learning process. Additionally, units would have the inherent mission of providing the training in common soldier skills and MOS related tasks which would further the education of the CI Assistants, and insure that they were fully qualified in their specialty.

After the probation period, the unit commander would complete a letter either recommending that the individual be accredited as a CI Agent based on demonstrated performance and potential, or that the 97B10 not be favorably considered



for retention in the MOS. If favorable consideration was made, the individual would return to USAICS for 20 level training.

#### 4. Career Progression


The implementation of the 97B10 MOS was consistent with the Enlisted Personnel Management System (EPMS), and brought the MOS 97B in focus with the stated objective of EPMS by providing a realistic, clear and viable career progression path in the MOS from entry level to sergeant major.

Upon completing the 20 level training at USAICS, the next assignment would preferably be a strategic assignment with INSCOM. However, the possibility of receiving another tactical assignment would exist, dependent upon the needs of the Army. The desired assignment schedule would find personnel alternating between tactical and strategic positions. Once a soldier reached the 97B20 level, he could continue in the 97B field or, if qualified and favorably considered, could enter the Area Intelligence (97C) field. Figure 3 provides the normal career progression and training associated with the 97B MOS.

#### D. SUMMARY

This chapter has provided information on how the CI Assistant program was initiated and intended for implementation, based on a felt need for change. The phases of the soldier's early career were reviewed from the standpoint of





CAREER MANAGEMENT FIELD CHART  
(Extracted from AR 611-201 and FM 34-97B (Draft))

Figure 3



recruitment, formal training and utilization in the field. Additionally, the career progression an individual in the 97B MOS could expect was also provided. This information will be referred to in Chapters IV and V, as a diagnosis of the change process is accomplished.





#### IV. THE ACTIVATION OF THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

##### ASSISTANT PROGRAM

###### A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter begins the diagnosis of the change processes which occurred as the CI Assistant program evolved. The recruitment, screening process, and formal training phases are reviewed with the aid of the conceptual model developed in Chapter II. This model is a diagnostic tool, and is implicitly employed in identifying strengths and weaknesses associated with the implementation of the 97B10 program. The researcher has opted to view the program changes in chronological sequence rather than by grouping the data according to the components contained in the model. This methodology will permit separation of the change implementations into distinct phases, and prevent cross-referencing component items at the conclusion of the analysis. Since the diagnostic phase emphasizes processes, the focus will be on issues associated with the program rather than specific references to offices, agencies and units.

###### B. RECRUITMENT

The formal activation phase of the CI Assistant program was the authorization to begin recruiting personnel for the 97B10 MOS in May 1979. It is normal for station recruiters



to have the first contact with potential enlistees, followed by guidance counselors at AFEES. Regrettably, this is where the first weakness in the change process was identified. The components of the model which were identified as concerns in this phase included communication of MOS job information, the people who were affected by the lack of correct information, and the lack of a technological adjustment in the screening process. Unfortunately, the impact of the recruitment phase carried over into other aspects of the program, and may have medium range implications which could carry through the military cycle, eventually returning to the recruiting phase. USAREC consists of five Recruiting Regions which include the United States, its territories and possessions, and selected areas in overseas locations, e.g., Germany. These regions are further subdivided into districts, areas, and recruiting commands, with AFEES located throughout the five regions. Currently, in excess of 2,500 recruiting facilities exist, and although the organizational chain of command for USAREC is well defined and straightforward, the geographic area and number of offices is enormous.

Recruiter personnel are selected from all career management fields, and although they are experienced in the Army and have been well trained for their duties, they do not usually have in-depth knowledge of each Army MOS. Therefore, the receipt of correct information regarding the initial



recruiting effort in any career field is of paramount importance. Without this information, potential enlistees cannot be provided accurate data concerning the qualifications for the MOS, the job description, or the formal training to be received. USAREC personnel did not have an accurate or detailed job description for the 97B10 MOS until April 1981.

The initial information provided to USAREC contained only the correct requirements for entry to the MOS. Therefore, many of the soldiers who enlisted for 97B10 were provided with an inaccurate job description. Subsequent contracts for these personnel indicated 97B10 as the MOS for which they had enlisted, but the duty title and training to be received frequently indicated CI Agent and the 97B20 course of instruction respectively.

An interview with a station recruiter from the Western Region in May 1981 indicated the program was still unclear, and that a problem in disseminating the revised job description within recruiting channels might exist. The station recruiter from the Midwestern Region who was interviewed telephonically in July 1981 stated that he was aware of the recruitment effort in the 97B MOS, and had a copy of Change 15 to AR 611-201. However, when asked to explain any differences between a 97B10 and a 97B20, the response centered only on time in service.



In conducting research for preparing the questionnaire, two 97B10s were interviewed to gain an understanding of the recruitment process. As stated previously in Chapter III, the primary mission of a station recruiter is not to enlist an individual for a specific MOS, but to convince him to join the Army. However, one individual stated that he first heard of the MOS from the local recruiter, and both indicated a problem with the information provided by recruiting personnel and with their enlistment contracts. In interviewing soldiers and analyzing questionnaire data, it was revealed that 26.3 per cent of the soldiers obtained initial information on the MOS from their local recruiter. Furthermore, it was indicated that whether the information was obtained from station recruiters or guidance counselors at AFEES, 93 per cent received information that was only partially accurate, or that was completely inaccurate. All regions were cited as having provided inaccurate data.

An interview with two AFEES guidance counselors from the Midwestern Region was conducted in July 1981. Documentation concerning the MOS that was readily available at the AFEES included Change 15 to AR 611-201, and a computer printout containing MOS requirements, duty title and length of course for formal training. The MOS requirements were correct and indicated 97B10. However, the duty title was CI Agent and the course of instruction to be attended was listed as 18 weeks. This is the course length associated with the CI





Agent course. During the course of the interview, the counselors revealed that they were unfamiliar with the 97B MOS, and were uncertain of the similarities and differences between a 97B10 and a 97B20.

The guidance counselors and station recruiters displayed a genuine concern for their lack of knowledge of the 97B10 MOS, and indicated they would willingly advise a potential enlistee of their limitations when presenting the MOS data. This attitude reflects a healthy command atmosphere, and when interviewing soldiers and analyzing questionnaire data it was readily apparent that this attitude dominates. Only nine per cent of the respondents to the questionnaire felt that the data presented by recruiter personnel was not the best information available at the time they enlisted.

The initial detection of the error in and subsequent correction of the MOS job description required a considerable length of time. During this period, approximately 340 personnel entered the Army with information which was incorrect. This resulted in soldiers' expectations of the 97B MOS to be altered significantly when the discovery was made. Although the recruiting phase is now nearing the steady state, the impact of the recruitment phase may continue to have an adverse effect on the CI Assistant program for an extended length of time, carrying over into other phases of the program.



### C. SCREENING PROCESS

The screening of recruits which was included in the initial design of the change process was accomplished from May 1971 through November 1980, and then terminated, although the requirement for personnel to be clearable for access to SCI continues. During the time frame from September 1979 to September 1980, 229 personnel were considered for the 97B10 MOS. The total number approved for entry into MOS 97B10 was 117 (51.1 per cent). This relatively low approval rate was a direct result of applying the stringent acceptance standards for the 97B20 MOS to applicants for the 97B10 MOS. Although the technological expertise necessary to develop an effective CI Assistant screening process was available, the adjustment was not made. The immediate impact of discontinuing the screening process was an increase in the number of soldiers arriving at USAICS. The long term implications are much more difficult to ascertain, and will require further research. In discussing the termination of the screening process with staff and faculty members at USAICS, unit supervisors and commanders, opinions varied. Some felt the impact would be minimal, and other mechanisms, e.g., probation letters, could be employed to prevent soldiers who were not fully qualified from progressing in the 97B MOS. Others considered the elimination of screening to be a drastic measure, one that will lead to degradation of the 97B field. Further experience with soldiers who were not screened for



entry into the MOS will be required before a rational decision can be made.

#### D. FORMAL TRAINING

One organization which has dealt with these weaknesses from November 1980 to the publication of this document is USAICS. The information weakness identified in the recruitment phase carried over into the formal training of CI Assistants. A direct result of problems in the recruitment phase was the large number of incorrect enlistment contracts, with a corresponding change in soldier expectations when the inconsistencies were discovered at USAICS. This phase will deal with these interrelated problems, as well as the tasks USAICS was given in preparing a POI for the CI Assistant program.

##### 1. Initial Military Occupational Specialty Training

The intended design of the change process would find soldiers completing BCT and arriving at USAICS for the 97B10 course beginning in March 1981. However, due to the inaccuracies of the job description and course of instruction to be attended, major problems surfaced. Soldiers began arriving at USAICS to attend the CI Assistant course in November 1980. It was at this time that discoveries were made concerning the enlistment contract problems. This was normally the first indication for soldiers that the training and duty position they had been told they would receive



would not be realized. This had a traumatic impact on soldiers' morale and attitude toward the military, and placed a tremendous and unanticipated burden on the personnel in USAICS. Those who had been told they would be attending a 97B20 course with a possible civilian clothes assignment following their training were now being informed they would attend a CI Assistant course, and be assigned to a tactical unit. This represented a significant change in their initial expectations, and for some it meant that the level of training and the duty position they had selected would not be possible unless they reenlisted. In interviewing soldiers who were currently enrolled in a 97B10 course and would graduate in October 1981, 91.6 per cent indicated the information they had received from recruiter personnel, and their subsequent contract, was incorrect. This issue was of primary concern to the students, and they were extremely emotional and vocal in their responses. Clearly, they felt their needs and expectations had not been fulfilled, and they had been misled. Soldiers interviewed in units and analysis of the questionnaire data revealed 89.5 per cent of the enlistment contracts were incorrect, with 64 per cent indicating they were informed they could be assigned to a civilian clothes or other non-tactical assignment. Personnel assigned to units were less concerned over the recruitment phase than students at USAICS. This is perhaps a natural phenomenon, since the students have a more recent





experience with the issue, and actions are in progress at USAICS to resolve the situation, thus keeping the subject to the forefront. Soldiers in the field consider the issue as history, and are more oriented toward future opportunities in the MOS.

Since 97B10s arrived four months prior to the start of the first CI Assistant course, two actions were implemented to compensate for this event. It was determined that the first arrivals would be allowed to attend the 97B20 course, and if they failed they would be recycled to a 97B10 course without adverse action. Additionally, the first 97B10 course date was changed from March to January 1981. This latter decision required the CI Assistant course front-end analysis to be curtailed, and an intensive effort to complete the POI by the end of December 1980. The staff and faculty completed the POI, which centered on tactical CI and OPSEC. However, concern was expressed by some faculty members interviewed that the areas covered would meet the needs of units. This is an intuitive question, and is a logical consideration when implementing an entry level MOS for the first time. Although the intended design of the CI Assistant POI was closely related to the CI Agent course, minus investigations and special operations, field experience with the program was nonexistent. Furthermore, OPSEC was a relatively newly designed program combining many of the actions tactical units had formerly accomplished as separate



entities. The OPSEC programs which had been developed in recent years were in keeping with the spirit and intent of the OPSEC effort; programs were tailored to each unit, and were accomplished using various methodologies. Implementation of the CI Assistant program did not present a new technology, but it did represent a modification that had not been previously attempted, and consequently a base of knowledge concerning the actual employment of CI Assistants did not exist. Combined with the varied approaches used by units in accomplishing OPSEC, the exact training CI Assistants should receive was an area that would require further consideration. This uncertainty of which tasks would be accomplished in the field was passed from the faculty members to the students. Fifty-six per cent of the respondents to the questionnaire relayed that personnel at USAICS were not fully aware of the tasks that would be performed in the field, an opinion which also surfaced during soldier interviews.

The first group of CI Assistants to attend the 97B20 course experienced difficulties in successfully completing the course, primarily in the area of Personnel Security Investigations (PSI). The attrition rate was approximately 40 per cent. Additional difficulties were encountered, based primarily on the students' varying Army experience levels. The 97B20 course consisted of instruction oriented toward the in-service recruit for 97B. The use of acronyms



and terms normally considered common knowledge were foreign to the 97B10s. Although some failed the 97B20 course, a few 97B10s currently in the field did complete the Agent course. Those who did not complete the course were recycled into a 97B10 class.

During the initial phase of training, 97B10 contract disputes continued, with 96 students attempting to renegotiate their contract. Twenty-nine opted for unfulfilled contracts, with the remainder choosing 97B10 training. Adjudication of the requests for unfulfilled contracts resulted in five cases being considered eligible for filing unfulfilled contracts. The remainder were not considered valid cases, because the following statement was contained in their enlistment contract:

I understand that I will be on probation status until I am 21 years of age or one year after successful completion of MOS 97B training, whichever is longer. [Ref. 20]

Furthermore, it was determined that soldiers who came on active duty prior to 15 February 1981 would be offered 97B20 training, since when they enlisted this was the only course available [Ref. 20]. Approximately 17 personnel selected the 97B20 training, but again the failure rate was extremely high. Respondents to the questionnaire indicated that 19.3 per cent attempted to file for unfulfilled contracts or be reclassified into another MOS. Eventually, these personnel joined the majority of the students in signing a waiver to their enlistment contract, and completed the 97B10 course.



This action continued through July 1981, and although students are now arriving with correct contracts, it does represent a significant event in the implementation phase of the program.

The content for the 97B10 course followed the implementation design, and has been effective in preparing soldiers for tactical CI and OPSEC duties. According to questionnaire responses 66 per cent indicated the training they received prepared them satisfactorily or marginally satisfactorily for duty in their units. The overwhelming response from interviews and questionnaire responses was that the task they were best trained in was centered on tactical CI or OPSEC, with 84.2 per cent indicating these areas. Additionally, the majority of the soldiers relayed that the quality of instruction by USAICS was excellent to good. This, combined with the high number of responses in the area best trained in, indicates that USAICS has been very effective in providing high quality and pertinent instruction.

Currently, proposals are pending which may have an impact on the future training CI Assistants will receive. One action which is under consideration is to eliminate selected CI inspections, and make them a function of the unit Security Managers, except in cases such as higher command or Inspector General (IG) inspections. Additional considerations which may have an effect on CI tasks and functions are





the reinstitution of selected training functions for other units which were previously accomplished by supporting CI units. Additionally, a review is currently being conducted at the DA level, with closer integration of tactical CI and OPSEC doctrine the goal. These proposals and actions may require modification to the current 97B10 POI, dependent upon the exact changes implemented. The continual growth of the 97B10 population and experience level will facilitate USAICS efforts in identifying the specific tasks performed in the field, and assist in accomplishing any required modifications to the POI.

This section does not present the training received by the 97B10s in terms of tasks performed in units. This topic is reserved for Chapter V, and will include recommendations for possible changes to the POI, as made by supervisors and commanders. The diagnosis of the initial training in 97B10 skills was presented to depict the problems USAICS was confronted with in terms of the continuation of the recruiting phase weakness, and their effectiveness in establishing a CI Assistant POI which would prepare soldiers for MOS tasks in tactical CI and OPSEC. Although the task was complicated by problems external to USAICS, and the lack of prior experience with 97B10 duty performance in the field was present, USAICS designed implementation was effective.



## 2. Additional Formal Training Requirements

Soldiers successfully completing the probationary period, and selected for training in 97B20 skills, will again return to USAICS. This training will supplement previous training, and investigative and special operations topics will be presented. As of the publication of this thesis, the exact structure and content of this course is under consideration. The first group of 97B10s eligible for returning to USAICS will occur in March 1982. Those returning for training will be 21 years of age, and have a minimum of one year in a tactical unit. Upon completing the course, the individuals will be issued a badge and credentials, if duties require their use.

Currently, the planning for the course is based on a modular approach of instruction. The basic premise for this concept is the different experience and training levels personnel reporting for the 97B20 course will have. Some will arrive who are in-service recruits, and may have two or more years of Army experience, but neither experience nor training in 97B. The soldiers who have completed the 97B10 training will have varying degrees of Army experience, and will have been trained in all but selected 97B topics. However, as with any training, the retention level declines over time, and some refresher training will be required. The modular concept centers on offering the 97B20 course, with in-service recruits completing the 18 week course, and



97B10s entering the last eight weeks to receive refresher, investigative and special operations training. Once the individual completes the course, the MOS 97B20 will be awarded.

#### E. SUMMARY

This chapter has presented the strengths and weaknesses associated with the CI Assistant program in the recruiting and formal training phases. Although the strengths and weaknesses are implicitly tied to the model, the significance lies in the processes and issues. The model is merely a device to assist in the diagnosis. The recruitment problems of incorrect information and contracts have had an adverse impact on the program, which carried over into the formal training phase. Although the faculty was uncertain of the tasks 97B10s would be performing in the field, the POI developed and implemented has been effective in training soldiers in tactical CI and OPSEC.

The diagnosis of the change process will continue in Chapter V, emphasizing the actual employment of 97B10s in a unit. As can be seen thus far, the implementation of the program has had an impact on several aspects of the Army's organization, and what could have been termed a minimal change involving a structural adjustment and modification of tasks has affected other areas as well.



## V. THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ASSISTANT IN THE MILITARY UNIT

### A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides the diagnosis of CI Assistants in tactical units. The role of 97B10s will be reviewed from the soldiers', supervisors' and commanders' perspectives, and compared with the intended use of 97B10s. The duties accomplished and the performance of CI Assistants will also be examined. The satisfaction of soldiers in accomplishing their unit duties, and their retention potential, will culminate the diagnosis of the program. Within this phase, the model components that are affected include: a lack of communication to units regarding the 97B10 program; a structural deficiency that was initially identified, but was not acted upon; and the commanders, supervisors and soldiers who are charged with implementing the effective use of CI Assistants within the tactical unit.

### B. ROLE AND DUTIES PERFORMED

The first 97B10s arrived at their units beginning in May 1980. Upon their arrival, and to the publication of this thesis, information provided to units concerning the 97B10 program has been minimal. The document units have in common on the concept, training and duty restrictions of CI Assistants is limited to the ACSIGRAM. As previously noted, this





program does not represent a new technology. However, the lack of information disseminated to units has created difficulties. Unit supervisors were not aware of the training 97B10s had received, or the duties which they were capable of performing. This led to an educational process consisting of 97B10s explaining what they had been trained in and what tasks they could accomplish. The uncertainty experienced by supervisors caused them to feel frustrated, and unsure of the manner in which to train and utilize CI Assistants. This lack of information to units can be transformed into a lack of expertise, and in the case of the CI Assistant program, caused units to be at a distinct disadvantage in managing 97B10s. A degree of resistance can be anticipated with almost any change in an organization. However, in the case of the CI Assistant program, the lack of information given to units has compounded this resistance.

Supervisors surfaced one additional consideration which appears to have contributed to resistance toward the program. Although they considered the majority of soldiers capable of performing as Assistants and having the potential to become Agents, the unanimous opinion was that the screening process should be reestablished. It was felt this would reduce the possibility of soldiers who are not qualified for the 97B MOS from entering the field, prevent other methods of elimination from being used, and reduce the burden on units.



Although resistance to the program was noted, it was based on a personal resistance, primarily in first line supervisors. This resistance was based on the lack of information concerning the program, a dislike for managing junior enlisted personnel, being confronted with the duties and problems associated with younger soldiers, and the fact that the CI Assistants were allowed into the 97B field without the requirements supervisors had to meet, e.g., screening, prior service, etc. Commanders were more positive toward the program, and considered the action as a positive step in improving the MOS. Although personal resistance was observed, organizational resistance was not identified during the course of the interviews.

The lack of information slowed the process of training and employing CI Assistants, and because there was minimal data available to units from higher headquarters, units opened informal communication networks with adjacent units and higher headquarters. Although informal networks with similar units are not undesirable, the need to open these channels further frustrated unit supervisors, who felt more complete information should have been provided prior to the arrival of CI Assistants.

In interviewing supervisors and commanders, the goal of initiating the program was deduced from other sources of information, but the intended employment and career progression were unclear. One of the basic concepts in the design



of the program was that the 97B10 would work as a member of a team with more experienced CI Agents. While the exact status of all units is unknown, the units visited were critically short senior Agent personnel. In all three units, the senior personnel were limited to platoon/section leaders and sergeants. In these positions, their efforts were oriented toward administrative and management duties rather than operational CI duties. It was also noted that there was an average of one senior enlisted Agent per ten CI Assistants. Furthermore, in one unit there were no senior enlisted Agents present as of September 1981. In another unit two senior enlisted Agents were present, but one anticipated a permanent change of station in the near future, leaving one 97B50 to supervise approximately 25 CI Assistants. The shortage of senior Agents has resulted in minimal team training, and has required 97B10s to become team leaders and perform some of the duties of a CI Agent, such as conducting inspections and surveys, rather than assisting in these tasks. Additionally, this shortage of senior Agents has resulted in 97B10s preparing and presenting unit MOS training where more experienced personnel were anticipated.

Supervisors and commanders indicated that CI Assistants had been well trained in tactical CI and OPSEC. Supervisors did, however, indicate that more training was needed in report writing and administrative duties such as typing, the Army Functional File System, etc. The lack of initial



information caused some consternation among supervisors as to the direction unit training should take. Supervisors indicated that training was oriented toward preparing soldiers for the next skill level, and continuing their education in tactical CI and OPSEC. A shortage of training materials for 97B10s has been experienced, in terms of a soldier's manual and job books for CI Assistants. As of the publication of this document, these items are still not available in the field. The 97B10s also feel that this training material shortage is a problem. Interviews with soldiers and results from the questionnaire revealed that 52.7 per cent of the respondents considered the availability of training materials in the unit fair to poor.

In conducting interviews with soldiers, supervisors, and commanders, it was ascertained that the role CI Assistants are playing in units is not as extensive as was initially intended. Several factors enter into this consideration. As previously noted, units receiving soldiers had little prior knowledge of the program, or of the training soldiers had received. This caused an unavoidable unit delay in implementing training and employment programs until this information could be ascertained. The units visited have been understrength for a continuing period of time. Therefore, taskings were frequently beyond their capabilities. The rapid growth experienced with the introduction of the CI Assistants gave the gaining units expanded capabilities, but







units requesting support were not fully aware that additional assets were available. Additionally, two units had recently reorganized, resulting in a change of tasking procedures for CI support. During this transition process, requests for CI support were minimal.

Operations Security programs in units supported by CI units vary from extensive to minimal. This is attributed to the degree of emphasis placed on OPSEC by unit commanders. However, as the CI units gain experience in working with 97B10s, and fully develop internal training programs, the realization that slack resources are available will permit an increase in the amount of CI support that can be provided.

The current tasks performed by CI Assistants are in keeping with the duties outlined in the regulation, although due to the shortage of senior 97B personnel some functions are being performed without close supervision. Even with these additional duties, 97B10s are not being employed to optimize their current or potential capabilities. Results from the questionnaire revealed that the most frequent MOS tasks performed were CI inspections, surveys and OPSEC. However, according to 65 per cent of the respondents, the majority of the duty day was spent accomplishing garrison requirements, and MOS and common soldier skill training. Responses to the questionnaire indicated 33.3 per cent train one hour or less per week in MOS subjects, and 42.1 per cent train between two and six hours per week. In conducting



interviews with soldiers, this MOS related training was adjudged as low quality, due to the lack of qualified senior personnel and the fact that, due to other commitments, MOS training was often attended by a minimal number of soldiers.

Some of the 97B10s have been attached to other sections within units. Although these sections are performing functions related to tactical CI and OPSEC, e.g., S2 staff, OPSEC M & A section, the 97B10s are performing primarily clerical duties. Only one unit that was observed is employing soldiers in this manner, but it is of interest that in an evaluation of MOS 97B, 52 per cent of the potential supervisors in tactical units indicated they would utilize CI Assistants as clerks or motor pool maintenance personnel. Forty-eight per cent of the INSCOM potential supervisors indicated they would employ 97B10s as 97Ds or clerks/typists [Ref. 21]. This attitude may be a result of the lack of understanding concerning the CI Assistant program that supervisors had at the time of the evaluation, or it could relate to the unwillingness to consider the CI Assistant as an important addition to the CI field based on the given information. Respondents to the questionnaire indicated that supervisors are now aware of the duties performed by CI Assistants, and that supervisors consider the CI Assistant to be an asset to the 97B field. Therefore, the use of CI Assistants in the role of administrative specialists, or as 97Ds, should diminish.



The assignment of 97B10s to units was based on authorized 97B20 MTOE positions. A change to the MTOE structure was to be made in March 1981, changing some positions to 97B10. Although the change was planned and instructions were contained in Circular 611-82 (Personnel Selection and Classification, Implementation of Change 15, AR 611-201) the redesignation of positions did not occur. This has resulted in the termination of the recruitment effort as of August 1981. The current intent is to begin recruitment in January 1982, after the MTOE changes have been made. This action could be considered a delay in the program. It may, however, be advantageous to the implementation. The delay will permit the recruiting program to become stabilized, and any further problems with inaccurate information and enlistment contracts should not be anticipated. Furthermore, units were experiencing too rapid a growth. Classes were graduating with an average of 40 CI Assistants every two months. Units which had been accustomed to operating with five Agents were now gaining as many as three to five CI Assistants with every graduating class. This not only created logistics problems, but did not allow a gradual integration of newly acquired 97B10s, and kept units in a state of flux. The delay in recruiting will permit units to normalize operations, and perhaps determine future gains in order to plan for the arrival of CI Assistants, rather than reacting to their arrival.



### C. JOB SATISFACTION

Soldiers interviewed and respondents to the questionnaire were asked if they were satisfied with the MOS duties they perform. Forty-seven per cent of the responses to the questionnaire indicated they were not satisfied. In conducting interviews, the primary reason for the lack of satisfaction was the infrequency with which they performed MOS related tasks, rather than a dislike for the tasks. As previously noted, some units have not had sufficient time to normalize operations since the rapid growth they have experienced with CI Assistants, and therefore they have not extended to the optimum the CI support they are now capable of providing. Furthermore, it was noted that opinions on satisfaction were positively correlated on a unit basis. As an example, one unit visited conducted less than two hours of MOS training per week, and the CI support missions were infrequent. Soldiers indicated they were extremely dissatisfied with the 97B10 MOS, because they spent the majority of their time performing motor stables, fatigue details and clerical support. Another unit visited also had infrequent CI missions, but had initiated an intensive and aggressive training program. Soldiers in this unit, although looking forward to more mission tasking, were satisfied with the MOS. Additionally, this unit had taken and was preparing to undertake further measures to increase the amount of CI support by informing units of their expanded capabilities.





This indicates that the variable of management style can play an important part in the overall satisfaction soldiers experience in the MOS and the unit. The supervisors of soldiers who were totally dissatisfied looked upon the 97B10s as a source of manpower, and were not actively pursuing means of improving their professional or personal development. By contrast, the unit where satisfaction was noted was marked by supervisors who displayed a genuine concern for the soldiers' professional and personal development. This certainly is not a new discovery, but does reemphasize the importance management style can play.

Soldiers interviewed indicated that nicknames had been given to the 97B10s, such as "baby agents", "spooklets" or "shadow agents". Soldiers in units where training and MOS tasks were minimal, and which had the CI Assistants primarily performing fatigue details, considered these nicknames as derogatory. The use of such titles by supervisors was viewed by soldiers as indicative of how the unit felt toward the CI Assistants. Responses to the questionnaire revealed that 21.1 per cent of the soldiers felt their supervisors considered the MOS 97B10 as very unimportant or unimportant. Again, this response can be associated with units having marginal training programs and a low frequency of CI missions. Therefore, it is hypothesized that the 12 respondents who indicated their supervisors do not consider the 97B10 MOS as an important addition to the CI field would



come from two or three units, rather than twelve separate units.

An additional factor which has adversely affected satisfaction with the MOS is the recruitment difficulties encountered by most of the soldiers. Although soldiers in units do not hold this as a primary reason for dissatisfaction with the MOS, it has caused CI Assistants to be bitter. Their initial expectations of becoming a CI Agent, and performing the associated tasks, are now further away than when they enlisted. For those who are 18 years of age, it has meant that their plan of becoming an Agent in a non-tactical unit will not be realized, unless they reenlist. This, combined with the lack of training and low MOS task performance, has caused some to be firmly committed to leaving the service after their initial enlistment. Again, interviews with soldiers in units that were taking an aggressive approach to training and increasing CI support indicated a more positive outlook, and were either undecided or intended to reenlist.

#### D. RETENTION POTENTIAL

One of the major goals of the CI Assistant program was to increase the active duty strength of junior CI personnel. To this extent the program will increase the strength, however not by the numbers anticipated or desired. Currently, 24.6 per cent of the respondents to the questionnaire have indicated they intend to reenlist for the 97B MOS. The



overall Army reenlistment rate for the first nine months of Fiscal Year 1980 for first term soldiers was 59.7 per cent. Although an official goal has not been established for the 97B10 reenlistment rate, it was anticipated that approximately 50 per cent would reenlist.

In interviewing soldiers, the reasons for not reenlisting included dissatisfaction with the MOS, with 21.1 per cent of the respondents to the questionnaire providing this reason. Others do not plan on reenlisting for other reasons, which ranged from too many fatigue details to a dislike for the Army way of life. Responses to the questionnaire revealed 12.3 per cent would not reenlist because of reasons other than the MOS. An additional 10.5 per cent indicated they intend to reenlist, however they currently plan to reenlist for another MI or non-MI MOS.

The largest category consists of those soldiers who are currently undecided. Many variables enter into this decision process, but the more salient factors included were an optimistic attitude that training and mission requirements would improve; and that they will be allowed to return for 97B20 training when they become eligible. Because of the problems encountered in the recruitment phase, soldiers are somewhat skeptical that they will return to USAICS as scheduled. Responses to the questionnaire indicated that 29.8 per cent of the soldiers are currently undecided concerning reenlistment.



The low reenlistment intent of soldiers is again closely associated with unit programs and management techniques. Interviews with soldiers in units with a weak training program and low CI support requirements were more inclined to not reenlist or to reenlist for another MOS. Units which have taken positive action to develop a viable training program and increase their CI support to tactical units are identified with soldiers who intend to reenlist for their current MOS or are undecided. Based on these findings, the reenlistment rate can be improved. Although specific cost data was not collected, it would appear that under the current conditions the CI Assistant program is not cost effective. Even if 50 per cent of those currently undecided, or indicating they will reenlist for another MOS, were to remain in the 97B field, the intended reenlistment rate would be only 44.8 per cent.

#### E. SUMMARY

This chapter has provided strengths and weaknesses associated with the role CI Assistants are filling in tactical units, and the job satisfaction experienced by 97B10s. Although the intended role of CI Assistants is being applied as described in AR 611-201, the extent to which they are being teamed with senior personnel, trained in MOS skills, and performing tactical CI and OPSEC functions, is below the anticipated level. This has resulted in 97B10s performing





duties that have been interpreted by many CI Assistants as "duty soldiers", and caused a lack of job satisfaction in the MOS. This dissatisfaction in the MOS caused the intention for reenlistment to fall well below the Army's overall first term enlistment rate.

The failure to apply a structural change to unit MTOE positions for 97B10 has deferred further recruitment of CI Assistants until the adjustment has been made. This delay in further recruitment should have a positive effect in terms of allowing time for final correction of deficiencies in the recruitment phase, and allow units to reach a steady state in training and other programs. The reinstitution of the recruitment effort should then allow units to accept CI Assistants under more normalized conditions, and not present an unexpected rapid growth.



## VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### A. CONCLUSIONS

The researcher considers the current state of the Counterintelligence Assistant program to be ineffective. Although the program was initially well designed and planned, and the need for the program is vital to the 97B field, the weaknesses identified in the implementation have offset the original intent of the program. The intended change appeared as a straightforward modification of CI tasks and structure. However, as the implementation progressed, the processes became more complex and affected other areas of the Army's organization.

A change within a complex organization normally requires a longer period of time than that associated with the CI Assistant program. From the initial FORSCOM proposal to revise the MOS in September 1978 until the active recruitment for 97B10s began in May 1979, only eight months elapsed. Within such a complex bureaucratic organization this is a relatively short period of time. The eight months from proposal to activation may not have allowed sufficient time for all necessary objectives to be planned and accomplished correctly in achieving the ultimate goal. Indicators that this may have been the case are the weaknesses in the recruitment phase; the failure to adjust the screening process, causing



it to be discontinued for 97B10; the early arrival of students at USAICS, causing the initial class to be moved up two months; the lack of information provided to units; and the failure to submit MTOE changes on schedule, which resulted in termination of the recruitment effort.

The arrival of 97B10s in tactical MI units, while expected, was not well publicized. Supervisors and commanders who had little prior knowledge of the CI Assistant program found the CI sections growing at a tremendous rate, some over 400 per cent in slightly more than a year. This lack of knowledge on the program, and unanticipated growth rate, caused units to falter initially in developing training programs and employing CI Assistants. Prior to the 97B10s' arrival in units, the majority of supervisors indicated they would employ CI Assistants as 97Ds, maintenance personnel or clerks. In some instances this philosophy has been followed, a practice which is criticized by 97B10s. A shortage of senior Agent personnel compounded the problem of developing training programs and employing CI Assistants as intended. This has resulted in 97B10s actually accomplishing tasks for which they were intended to only provide assistance in completing, and therefore not gaining the experience they would have received by observing and assisting the senior Agent personnel. Additionally, the frequency of MOS training is in some instances very low. Unit MOS training in skill level one and two subject areas is frequently being conducted



by 97B10s. The value of this training is questionable, as the 97B10s have rarely accomplished the tasks they are presenting.

Operations Security continues to represent a program that has not yet expanded to its full potential. Although programs exist in most units, the emphasis placed on OPSEC by supported units, and the innovative methods developed by CI units, vary. The previous shortage of CI assets, combined with the growing stages, have not yet permitted the utilization of slack resources to upgrade OPSEC programs through aggressive and innovative approaches. The management style of supervisors and commanders will play an integral part in this development. Units which have undertaken positive action toward training and expanding CI tactical and OPSEC support are associated with soldiers who are satisfied with their job and are contemplating reenlistment for the 97B MOS. Units that are not actively pursuing training programs, and employ 97B10s primarily in roles associated with clerical support, maintenance and fatigue details are marked with soldiers who are dissatisfied with the unit and the MOS, and intend to reenlist for another MOS, or do not plan to reenlist at all.

The intent for reenlistment is currently extremely low, at 24.6 per cent. Although the intentions for reenlistment may improve as the program reaches a steady state, some factors which have contributed to this current trend are:





the recruitment problems that caused the expectations of soldiers to be deferred, for some as much as three years; a skeptical view by soldiers that they will not be returned to USAICS for skill level two training upon completion of the probation period; the shortage of MOS training and performance of CI related tasks, resulting in 97B10s accomplishing duties they consider less than desirable. Unless these conditions can be improved, it is doubtful that the reenlistment rate will increase significantly.

#### B. RECOMMENDATIONS

With the termination of the recruitment effort in August 1981, the identified problem in the recruiting phase should be corrected. This will allow soldiers to be provided the correct job description, and therefore no further complaints of unfulfilled contracts should be anticipated. Additionally, soldiers arriving at USAICS will be fully aware that they are to be trained as CI Assistants, and will serve their initial assignment in a tactical unit. This will alleviate the misconceptions soldiers previously encountered upon their arrival at USAICS. The actions currently in progress at USAICS to resolve the enlistment contract disputes, and the adverse impact this has had on the morale of soldiers attending the 97B10 course, should abate during this period. This will permit USAICS to normalize operations, and improve the morale of future students.



According to soldiers, supervisors, commanders, and the observations of the researcher, USAICS is providing instruction of excellent quality which is preparing soldiers for tasks related to tactical CI and OPSEC. The initial knowledge possessed by USAICS of the tasks 97B10s would perform in units was limited, and the uncertainty they conveyed to students in this area was understandable. However, as the program continues, further studies and field evaluations by USAICS can improve their knowledge of tasks accomplished in units, and identify areas that will require further instruction. This will allow USAICS faculty and staff to indicate more positively to students the various types of duties they will perform, and facilitate modification of the existing POI to meet unit needs.

Although the program is nearing steady state in units, additional information would be beneficial in topics such as training received, reiteration of the intended employment, the rate units can anticipate CI Assistant gains, and the specific procedures that will be followed in returning CI Assistants to USAICS for accreditation as Agents. This information would assist units in planning for the CI Assistant's arrival and eliminate the skepticism currently experienced by soldiers in the field.

The risk of allowing an individual to have access to sensitive information as an Agent when the individual's loyalty, integrity, discretion and/or character are unsuited



for such duties should be reduced by the continuation of the requirement for eligibility to access to SCI. The effects that the termination of the screening process have had on the 97B field will require further research.

Perhaps the most difficult, and yet most critical, phase of the program requiring attention is the CI Assistant in the field. Without question, the contributions of the CI Assistant can improve the survivability of units on the modern battlefield. Units receiving CI support must be made aware of the threat they will face, and the appropriate measures to counter this threat. This will require an intensive effort to provide information to all commanders regarding the criticality of CI support, and how it can increase a unit's effectiveness. Commanders who are unaware of or elect not to use available CI resources are forgoing a valuable asset designed to complement their efforts in accomplishing their combat mission. Perhaps the most effective means of disseminating this information is through direct contact with commanders and supervisors of CI personnel. However, prior to this action commanders and supervisors of CI personnel must insure that training programs have been developed that not only maintain, but increase, the level of competence and expertise of CI personnel. Furthermore, innovation is needed in developing OPSEC programs that will insure optimal support is rendered. Commanders who fail to recognize the importance of tactical CI



and OPSEC, and the important role CI Assistants can play in this area, are doing a disservice to the soldier, the supported unit, and the Military Intelligence Branch.





## APPENDIX A

### INTERVIEW AND QUESTIONNAIRE METHODOLOGY

#### INTRODUCTION

This appendix provides the methodology employed in conducting interviews and designing, administering and receiving feedback from the questionnaire. Furthermore, identified strengths and weaknesses of the interview techniques used and questionnaire design are provided, followed by recommendations for consideration should a similar study be conducted at a future date.

#### INTERVIEWS

The decision to use interviews conducted with soldiers, supervisors and commanders as the primary source of data was made at the onset of thesis research, in April 1981. Interviewing allowed direct two-way communication, permitted clarification of questions and responses, and gained additional data which might not have otherwise been discovered. A bottom-up approach was followed in each unit by initially interviewing soldiers, followed by immediate supervisors, and then commanders. When designing the interview questions, the researcher incorporated prior interview experience obtained while accomplishing duties in the Military Intelligence field, knowledge gained from courses at the Naval



Postgraduate School, and information obtained from existing publications. Questions were open-ended, and sought to gain individual thoughts and opinions on the CI Assistant program. Questions were limited in number to allow for expansion in selected areas, or the addition of other topics of interest.

The number of personnel to be interviewed was based on the availability of soldiers present for duty in the unit on the days the researcher would be present on the installation. In conducting the interviews the first objective was to place the respondent at ease and create an atmosphere conducive to two-way communication. Initially, a one-on-one interview was attempted, but respondents appeared uneasy in this situation. After the same occurrence with a two-on-one session, the number of personnel was increased to four. This method was effective, and created an environment which led to a free exchange of thoughts and comments. Additionally, this procedure assisted some less verbal individuals who would not have been as likely to provide information in a one-on-one session. One group interviewed consisted of 24 personnel, which was too large a number for a single session. Personnel felt free to provide their opinions, but discussion often overlapped. This required stopping for clarification on several occasions. Additionally, when a particularly sensitive subject was surfaced by one of the respondents, the remainder of the group was affected, and the tendency



was to band together in selected topical areas. This peer pressure was not experienced in the smaller groups.

A total of 43 soldiers, supervisors and commanders were personally interviewed at three installations. The selection of the three installations was based on the different types of units provided CI support (Airborne, Armored and Infantry), and the high density of 97B10s at these installations. Additionally, 34 students, staff and faculty members were interviewed at USAICS. Personal interviews were also conducted with two station recruiters in the Western Region, and two AFEES guidance counselors in the Midwestern Region. Additionally, telephonic interviews were conducted with station recruiters, and personnel at a District Recruiting Command headquarters; Headquarters, USAREC; Headquarters, TRADOC; Headquarters, FORSCOM; and DA agencies and staffs.

#### QUESTIONNAIRE

The decision to administer a questionnaire as a supplement to data obtained from soldier interviews was made on 3 May 1981. The intent of developing and administering a questionnaire was not for the expressed purpose of providing a lengthy statistical analysis, but to gain data from soldiers in several unit locations in the United States and overseas areas. Although the number of soldiers interviewed does represent a significant number, since 31 of a possible 94, or 32.9 per cent of all 97B10s, were interviewed, this



represents only three unit programs. The use of a questionnaire allowed for a minimum of 21 unit inputs on a worldwide basis, and therefore a more comprehensive review of the program. To elicit frank and open responses, personnel sent a questionnaire or interviewed were granted confidentiality.

Research and development of the questionnaire was accomplished from 8 May through 12 July 1981. Selected documents were reviewed, which provided information on preparation and design of questions, and several previous surveys were reviewed for question structure and format. The finalized question design, content and format were verified with a document which provided a comprehensive overview of questionnaire design [Ref. 22]. Five areas were selected for inclusion in the questionnaire. These areas were: demographic data, recruitment information, formal training received at USAICS, duty performance and job satisfaction, and retention potential in 97B. The last item of the questionnaire allowed soldiers to enter any comments concerning the 97B10 MOS. Questions were developed specifically for the CI Assistant program, and permitted respondents to select a prepared answer or, in several instances, enter a written response of their own selection. The length of the questionnaire was held to less than 50 questions to enhance the possible number of responses. The researcher hypothesized that a lengthy questionnaire might have a chilling effect on the respondents, and thus be discarded as too time-consuming. This





was of particular concern in view of the several open-ended questions and item 49, which allowed additional comments. Although some questions were based on a Likert scale, open-ended questions were considered a viable means of allowing personnel to provide responses specific to their unit, and to give an insight into their thoughts and opinions.

Two interviews were conducted with CI Assistants prior to designing the questionnaire in order to obtain insight into the processes of the program and insure that correct terminology was used. This information, combined with data collected from agencies and staffs within DA, provided the basis for selecting the areas and substance of the questionnaire. Throughout the process of writing the questionnaire, the researcher collaborated with a Naval Postgraduate School Professor recognized as an authority in questionnaire development and design. The final draft was completed on 23 July 1981, and was prepared in final form on 31 July 1981.

The sample size consisted of the entire population of CI Assistants assigned to units as of 31 July 1981. Assignment addresses were obtained for graduates of the 97B10 course, as well as those 97B10s who attended the CI Agent course prior to the implementation of the CI Assistant course. This process involved obtaining copies of class rosters and conducting an audit to identify personnel who had successfully completed the course. After personnel who had been eliminated from the Army, reclassified into another MOS, recycled



into a later 97B10 course, or were on casual duty pending assignment were identified, 94 personnel remained as possible respondents. It was because of the relatively small number of personnel in the field that the entire population was included. Assignment orders with applicable amendments were obtained, and in some instances the world-wide locator was used to identify pinpoint assignments. The distribution of the questionnaire is shown in Figure 4. All questionnaires were mailed on 3 August 1981.

The responses to the questionnaire began arriving 10 August 1981. Six questionnaires of personnel who could not be located were returned through postal channels, and these were discarded in computing the percentage of return. Therefore, 88 personnel could have responded to the questionnaire. A total of 57 responses were received, or 64.8 per cent (Figure 5). This is sufficient return to consider the questionnaire results valid. However, due to the small sample size, statistical analysis or inference must be used with caution. As an example, if the sample size were 100, and the observed responses were 50 per cent for an issue and 50 per cent against the issue, the statistical reliability at the 95 per cent level of confidence would be  $\pm 10.8$  [Ref. 23: p. 192]. As can be seen, the sampling error is relatively large for a sample size of 100 or smaller. Additionally, it should be noted that 30 of the respondents had been assigned to their units for only one to two months.



There is an adjustment period for soldiers when they are joining the unit's workforce, learning the norms of their new culture, and identifying which tasks and functions they are expected to perform. Therefore, their opportunities to participate in MOS related tasks and their knowledge of unit programs is justifiably limited during this period.

#### STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

Interviews and questionnaires each have distinct advantages and disadvantages. Interviews permit two-way communication, clarification of questions and responses, expansion of information, development of new areas of information and the opportunity to observe non-verbal communications. However, interviews are resource sensitive and, dependent upon the constraints that may exist, frequently only a limited data base can be obtained. Additionally, quantitative analysis of interview responses is more difficult, and requires an unbiased, subjective approach to insure that valid analysis occurs. A questionnaire is not as resource sensitive, and permits a larger contingent to provide data. Additionally, a questionnaire is more conducive to quantitative analysis. The disadvantages of a questionnaire include a lack of direct communication, inadvertent or intentional failure of respondents to reply to part or all of the questions, and the possibility that questions requiring further clarity are contained in the questionnaire. A degree of



uncertainty exists in insuring that respondents receive the questionnaire, particularly when variables such as reassignment, extended field exercises, leaves, temporary duties, and addresses to replacement companies and detachments are considered. The possibility also exists that a critical question or area may be undiscovered in a questionnaire, even though the opportunity to express relevant comments may be provided. Specific strengths and weaknesses associated with the interviews conducted and the questionnaire will be discussed in turn.

The interview methodology and techniques previously discussed were effective, with conducting a session with a large group the only weakness noted, as pointed out earlier. The questionnaire design, content, and format were effective in supplementing interview data. The use of open-ended questions permitted personnel to include responses unique to their unit, and allowed individuals to express personal views in a reasonable manner. Of the 57 responses, 38 contained additional comments in the last item of the questionnaire. These comments ranged in length from a few sentences to several pages, and provided valuable insight into the 97B10 program as seen from the soldier's viewpoint. However, one of the weaknesses of open-ended questions, that of respondents failing to provide a response, was experienced. Questions 24 and 32 provided no possible responses which could be selected, but required a written answer. Twenty-seven





personnel elected not to respond to question 24 (47.4 per cent), and 37 did not respond to question 32 (64.9 per cent).

Feedback received from personnel interviewed indicated that the questionnaire length, content and clarity were satisfactory. However, two questions were identified by some soldiers as lacking clarity. Question 26 requested the level of assignment and provided five possible choices: Combat Arms Division or Brigade, MI Group, MI Battalion, MI Company or Other. The point made, and well taken, was that if an individual was assigned to an MI Company which is subordinate to an MI Battalion, two possible choices would be correct. Question 40 requested soldiers to indicate if the training they had received prepared them beyond, exactly at, or below a level needed to accomplish tasks they perform in their MOS. The intent was unclear to some respondents, and both questions can be rectified by restructuring the questions.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are provided should a future study of a similar nature be considered. The number of CI Assistants in the field will unquestionably continue to grow. This will provide a larger and more experienced sample size, and when coupled with the absence of sufficient resources may warrant total reliance on a questionnaire. Four factors should be considered for modification of the



questionnaire design. Since a larger population will exist, a random sample may be polled rather than using the entire population. A larger sample size may also necessitate that the researcher reduce or eliminate open-ended questions and increase the emphasis on questions which have forced choice or Likert scale responses. This will reduce the manual manipulation and coding of data required in open-ended questions. Additionally, some questions or complete areas, such as recruitment, may be deleted as the 97B10 program reaches the steady state. More emphasis can then be placed on other areas, such as utilization and performance. As a final consideration, it is recommended that the questionnaire be administered to a small test group, to eliminate vague or ambiguous questions prior to distribution.

If possible, interviews with soldiers, supervisors and commanders should be conducted to provide a more comprehensive study. It would be desirable to conduct interviews at several locations in the United States and overseas. However, in the absence of sufficient resources, questionnaires for soldiers, supervisors and/or commanders may be the sole source of data collection.



Locations	NUMBER OF QUESTIONNAIRES	
	Pinpoint Assignments	Replacement Co/Det
Germany	4	12
Korea	4	0
Alaska	1	0
Hawaii	2	0
Fort Benning, GA	1	0
Fort Bliss, TX	1	0
*Fort Bragg, NC	18	0
Fort Campbell, KY	2	1
Fort Carson, CO	5	1
*Fort Hood, TX	9	4
*Fort Huachuca, AZ	2	0
Fort Knox, KY	1	0
Fort Lewis, WA	6	2
*Fort Ord, CA	7	1
Fort Polk, LA	3	0
Fort Riley, KA	1	2
Fort Stewart, GA	2	2

Subtotal: 69 25

Total Questionnaires Distributed: 94


\*Interviews were conducted at these installations

#### DISTRIBUTION SCHEME OF QUESTIONNAIRE

Figure 4



W  
E  
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L  
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# QUESTIONNAIRE RETURN

Figure 5





APPENDIX B  
QUESTIONNAIRE AND RESULTS

INTRODUCTION

This appendix provides a copy of the questionnaire administered to 97B10s, information on coding data for use with the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS), and frequencies and histograms from the questionnaire results. The strengths and weaknesses of the questionnaire were provided in Appendix A. Therefore, only the recommendations and considerations for coding and inputting data into the computer system are presented in this appendix. A copy of the questionnaire immediately precedes the data presentation, and includes the cover letter which provided basic instructions and a guarantee of confidentiality to respondents.

CODING DATA

The questionnaire was coded for use with the SPSS, after a front-end assessment was completed. This assessment was accomplished during the design phase of the questionnaire, and concentrated on insuring that forced choices were uniformly arranged. As an example, a question with choices of strongly agree to strongly disagree was prepared so that strongly agree was always the most positive choice. This



procedure reduces coding time, and data can be presented more effectively when choices are arranged in a uniform manner. Open-ended questions are easily coded. However, as the program develops, the possible responses to these questions will increase, and may require extensive manual manipulation. This, combined with the drawbacks noted in Appendix A, may further justify the elimination of open-ended questions in a larger sample.

The questionnaire required alphanumeric or written responses. These responses were then transformed into numerics for SPSS input. The advantage of this method is a more manageable process for coding data, and a reduced card case load, since each questionnaire required only one card. Additionally, the responses were represented by one digit, also a contributing factor to the use of one card per case. Two or more numerics can be used; however, caution must be exercised in the format statement and in coding the data to insure that each response is properly represented by the appropriate number of digits. All missing values were assigned a zero. Missing values indicate that an answer was not provided by the respondent.

In determining the variable and value labels, a front-end assessment can again be of benefit. The SPSS permits only 40 characters per variable label, and 16 characters per value label. These labels can be printed on the SPSS output and, if selected judiciously, can provide a descriptive title



for the printed data. This increases the readability, and improves understanding by the user. Additional considerations applied in coding the data and selecting the variables and value labels included a complete double check of the input data for accuracy, and a review of the labels by a disinterested party to insure descriptive titles were used.

Two questions from the questionnaire are provided in Figure 6, to depict the coding methodology used to input data for both a forced choice and an open-ended question. The value labels limitations imposed by SPSS required two titles to be used that might not be considered standard abbreviations. An explanation of these two titles is provided for clarity. Question 8 contains the short title "USAICS AND TRANS" on the SPSS histogram. This refers to a soldier who was attending another MI course at USAICS and, for reasons not stated, transferred into the 97B10 MOS. Question 36 uses the abbreviation "SOLD" on the SPSS histogram, which refers to basic soldier skill training. All other value labels are considered adequate for interpretation.

As previously noted, the entire population was included in the questionnaire distribution. Therefore, the mean and standard deviation represent a population mean and standard deviation, not a sample mean and standard deviation. Tests for significance are strictly applicable only for making inferences from sample data to conditions existing in a



larger population, and these tests are not appropriate when the entire population is considered [Ref. 24: p. 234]. Therefore, statistical tests were suppressed from the data output. If a question contains a choice that was not selected by any of the respondents, the SPSS will not include the choice on the histogram. A choice missing from a histogram should be interpreted as having been selected by none of the respondents.





Question 26. I am currently assigned to a position in a unit that can best be described as:

- \*1 = a. A Combat Arms Division or Brigade
- 2 = b. A Military Intelligence Group
- 3 = c. A Military Intelligence Battalion
- 4 = d. A Military Intelligence Company
- e. Other (please specify) \_\_\_\_\_

(Soldiers provided the following written responses to this question.)

- 5 = Military Assistance Center
- 6 = Corps Headquarters

Question 45. I am well satisfied with the geographic location of my unit.

- \*1 = a. Strongly agree
- 2 = b. Agree
- 3 = c. No opinion
- 4 = d. Disagree
- 5 = e. Strongly disagree

\*Numeric values were assigned to the responses as shown. Each question required one numeric value for SPSS input, and the values were placed in card columns 1 through 49 for each case.

#### EXAMPLE OF CODING QUESTIONS FOR SPSS INPUT

Figure 6



NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA - 93940

IN REPLY REFER TO  
NC 4(54CF)/mgk

Department of Administrative Science


31 July 1981

The purpose of this letter is to request your assistance in a research project concerning the 97B10 Military Occupational Speciality (MOS). An Army officer is assisting me in this study of the recruitment, training and job utilization of Counterintelligence Assistants. The enclosed questions are being sent to all 97B10s in the field who have completed either the 97B10 or 20 course of instruction.

The enclosed questions ask for general and specific information concerning the MOS. Your individual responses will be held in the strictest confidence and will not be released. Only unidentified group information will be used in this study. The questions should take approximately fifteen minutes to answer. A self addressed envelope has been enclosed for returning the questions.

Your answers will provide invaluable data concerning the implementation of the 97B10 MOS within the Military Intelligence field. Because the success of this research effort will naturally depend upon your response, your cooperation in this project will be gratefully appreciated.

Sincerely,




J. W. Creighton  
Professor of Management

Enclosure



# COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ASSISTANT



97B10



COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ASSISTANT (97B10)

INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING THIS INFORMATION DOCUMENT.

1. Read each question carefully and select one response. Circle your choice, or if you select a response requiring a written answer, place the information in the space provided. Please print your written responses.
2. The last question on this document provides you an opportunity to express any views or comments you consider relevant. Should you elect to complete this question, please print or write legibly to ensure your response is taken into consideration.

\* \* \* \* \*

1. My age on my last birthday was \_\_\_\_\_ years. (enter age)
2. My sex is:
  - a. Male
  - b. Female
3. My current education level is:
  - a. High school graduate or GED
  - b. Some college or technical school
  - c. Technical school degree or certificate
  - d. Bachelors degree (BA or BS)
  - e. Bachelors degree plus some graduate work
  - f. Masters degree
  - g. Other (please specify) \_\_\_\_\_
4. I have been assigned to my current unit \_\_\_\_\_ months. (enter months)
5. How many unit assignments have you had as a 97B10?
  - a. None
  - b. One
  - c. Two
  - d. More than two
6. Have you ever served in the Armed Forces prior to your current enlistment?
  - a. Yes
  - b. No
7. If you answered question 6 no, please go to question 8. If you answered question 6 yes, please provide your previous Military Occupational Speciality (MOS), years of service and the number of years you had a break in service.

\_\_\_\_\_ MOS, i.e., 11B10, 63C20, etc.

\_\_\_\_\_ Duty title

\_\_\_\_\_ Years of prior service

\_\_\_\_\_ Number of years break in service





8. How did you first hear about the MOS 97B10?
- a. The local station recruiter provided information on the MOS
  - b. The counselor at the Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Station (AFEES) provided the information
  - c. I heard about the MOS from a friend
  - d. Other (please specify) \_\_\_\_\_
9. I enlisted in the Army at the AFEES in \_\_\_\_\_.  
\_\_\_\_\_. (please indicate the city and state)
10. The information provided by recruiter personnel regarding the duties I would perform as a 97B10 was:
- a. Completely accurate
  - b. Partially accurate
  - c. Completely inaccurate
  - d. I cannot recall
11. How was the information about the 97B10 MOS presented to you?
- a. Presented verbally only
  - b. Presented verbally, and I read the job description in an Army Regulation
  - c. Presented verbally, and I read the job description from a pamphlet or other document
  - d. I read an Army Regulation only
  - e. I read a pamphlet or other document only
  - f. Other (please specify) \_\_\_\_\_
12. My enlistment contract for 97B10 was:
- a. Completely accurate
  - b. Inaccurate: indicated 97B10, but the job title was Counterintelligence Agent
  - c. Contained other errors \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ (please specify)
13. I was informed by recruiter personnel that I would be assigned to:
- a. A tactical unit, Corps level or below
  - b. A non-tactical unit
  - c. A civilian clothes assignment as a Counterintelligence Agent
  - d. I was not informed of possible assignments
14. The main reason I enlisted in the Army was:
- a. To gain job security
  - b. To have job satisfaction
  - c. To gain educational benefits
  - d. Other (please specify) \_\_\_\_\_



15. I selected the MOS 97B10 because:

- a. The job description sounded interesting
- b. I plan to use my military training and experience to gain a civilian job
- c. Of the choices I had, the 97B10 MOS was the best available
- d. Other (please specify) \_\_\_\_\_

16. I feel recruiter personnel provided me with information on the MOS 97B10 to the best of their ability and understanding, based on the information they received from their headquarters.

- a. Strongly agree
- b. Agree
- c. No opinion
- d. Disagree
- e. Strongly disagree

17. Upon my arrival at the United States Army Intelligence Center and School (USAICS) at Fort Huachuca:

- a. I entered the 97B10 course to be trained as a Counterintelligence Assistant as stated in my enlistment contract
- b. I was informed that my enlistment contract was incorrect and I signed a waiver to the contract prior to completion of the 97B10 course
- c. I was informed that my enlistment contract was incorrect, and I took action to have my enlistment contract invalidated, but later signed a waiver to complete the 97B10 course
- d. I was informed that my enlistment contract was incorrect, and attempted to be reclassified into another MOS, but later signed a waiver to complete the 97B10 course
- e. Other (please specify) \_\_\_\_\_

18. The MOS course of instruction I attended at USAICS is best described as:

- a. I attended a 97B10 course
- b. I initially attended a 97B20 course, but was recycled to a 97B10 course
- c. I initially attended a 97B10 course, and was recycled to another 97B10 course
- d. I attended a 97B20 course
- e. Other (please specify) \_\_\_\_\_

19. The job description for 97B10 provided by the USAICS personnel was:

- a. In complete agreement with the job description given by recruiters
- b. In partial agreement with the job description given by recruiters
- c. Completely different than the job description given by recruiters
- d. Other (please specify) \_\_\_\_\_



20. The personnel at USAICS were very knowledgeable about the tasks I would be performing at my unit of assignment.

- a. Strongly agree
- b. Agree
- c. No opinion
- d. Disagree
- e. Strongly disagree

21. The training I received at the 97B10 course prepared me for the duties I am performing in my unit:

- a. Satisfactorily
- b. Marginally satisfactorily
- c. Less than satisfactorily
- d. Unsatisfactorily

22. The 97B10 course prepared me best for tasks related to:

- a. Enemy intelligence collection assets
- b. Operations Security support
- c. Counterintelligence inspections and surveys
- d. Preparation of reports and summaries
- e. Other (please specify) \_\_\_\_\_

23. I feel the quality of instruction presented by the USAICS personnel was:

- a. Excellent
- b. Good
- c. Fair
- d. Poor
- e. No opinion

24. If I could change one area in the 97B10 course of instruction, the change would be: (please specify) \_\_\_\_\_

25. I am currently serving in a:

- a. 97B position
- b. A Military Intelligence MOS, but not a 97B position
- c. A position that is not a Military Intelligence MOS

26. I am currently assigned to a position in a unit that can best be described as:

- a. A Combat Arms Division or Brigade
- b. A Military Intelligence Group
- c. A Military Intelligence Battalion
- d. A Military Intelligence Company
- e. Other (please specify) \_\_\_\_\_



27. The majority of my duty day is spent accomplishing:

- a. Operations Security support
- b. Counterintelligence inspections and surveys
- c. Training in MOS and basic soldier skills within the unit
- d. Daily garrison requirements
- e. Other (please specify) \_\_\_\_\_

28. When I arrived at my present unit, my duties as a 97B10 were completely explained by my supervisors.

- a. Strongly agree
- b. Agree
- c. No opinion.
- d. Disagree
- e. Strongly disagree

29. My supervisors have a complete understanding of the duties of a 97B10, and what tasks they can accomplish.

- a. Strongly agree
- b. Agree
- c. No opinion
- d. Disagree
- e. Strongly disagree

30. The intelligence duties and tasks I have performed most frequently in my unit are best described as:

- a. Counterintelligence inspections and surveys
- b. Operations Security support
- c. Intelligence training for other units
- d. Other (please specify) \_\_\_\_\_

31. To what extent do you feel the tasks you are performing in your present assignment make use of what you learned in the 97B10 course?

- a. Highly related
- b. Somewhat related
- c. No opinion
- d. Minimally related
- e. Not related

32. What task areas of your present job were not covered in the 97B10 course?

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

33. How important do you feel your supervisors believe your job is to the success of the Military Intelligence mission?

- a. Very important
- b. Important
- c. No opinion
- d. Unimportant
- e. Very unimportant





34. In regard to the tasks I am performing as a 97B10, I find that I am satisfied with the duties I perform in the MOS.

- a. Strongly agree
- b. Agree
- c. No opinion
- d. Disagree
- e. Strongly disagree

35. The MOS related duties I perform in my unit are challenging.

- a. Strongly agree
- b. Agree
- c. No opinion
- d. Disagree
- e. Strongly Disagree

36. The training I have received at my unit is:

- a. Related to MOS tasks only
- b. Related to common soldier skills only
- c. A balance between MOS and common soldier skills
- d. I have received minimal training in MOS or common soldier skills

37. The training materials for 97B10 MOS related tasks available in the unit are:

- a. Outstanding
- b. Excellent
- c. Good
- d. Fair
- e. Poor

38. The average number of hours I spend each week participating in scheduled unit MOS training is:

- a. 0 to 1
- b. 2 to 6
- c. 7 to 11
- d. 12 to 16
- e. Over 16

39. I consider my MOS related duties to be an important portion of the Counterintelligence field.

- a. Strongly agree
- b. Agree
- c. No opinion
- d. Disagree
- e. Strongly disagree



40. The MOS related tasks I am required to perform in my unit are best described as:

- a. Exactly what I was trained for at the 97B10 course
- b. Beyond the training I received at the 97B10 course
- c. Below the training I received at the 97B10 course
- d. Other (please specify) \_\_\_\_\_

41. I have received follow-up information and clarification on the duties and tasks I am responsible for performing as a 97B10 from my supervisors.

- a. Agree
- b. Disagree

42. My supervisors have explained the career opportunities available to me, and the additional schools I am eligible for at all skill levels of the 97B MOS.

- a. Agree
- b. Only the career opportunities were discussed
- c. Only the schools I am eligible for were discussed
- d. Only the next skill level career opportunities and schools were discussed
- e. Other (please specify) \_\_\_\_\_

43. I feel the personnel in the unit who are senior 97Bs, but are not my supervisors, (i.e., co-workers) consider the MOS 97B10 as:

- a. An important addition to the 97B field
- b. Unimportant in the 97B field
- c. No opinion
- d. Other (please specify) \_\_\_\_\_

44. I am well satisfied with the unit I am currently assigned to:

- a. Strongly agree
- b. Agree
- c. No opinion
- d. Disagree
- e. Strongly disagree

45. I am well satisfied with the geographic location of my unit.

- a. Strongly agree
- b. Agree
- c. No opinion
- d. Disagree
- e. Strongly disagree

46. I am well satisfied with the duties I am performing as a 97B10.

- a. Strongly agree
- b. Agree
- c. No opinion
- d. Disagree
- e. Strongly disagree



47. If I could make the choice again, I would:

- a. Enlist for my current MOS
- b. Enlist for another Military Intelligence MOS
- c. Enlist for a non-Military Intelligence MOS
- d. Not enlist
- e. Other (please specify) \_\_\_\_\_

48. When my current enlistment is completed, I plan to:

- a. Reenlist for my current MOS
- b. Reenlist for a non-Military Intelligence MOS
- c. Not reenlist because of dissatisfaction with my MOS
- d. Not reenlist because of other reasons
- e. Other (please specify) \_\_\_\_\_

49. This space is reserved for any comments you may want to make concerning any aspect of the MOS 97B10.

Additional Comments:



AGE AGE OF RESPONDENT IN YEARS

CATEGORY LABEL	CCODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
18-20	1.	23	40.4	40.4	40.4
21-23	2.	18	31.6	31.6	71.9
24-26	3.	10	17.5	17.5	89.5
27-29	4.	1	1.8	1.8	91.2
30-32	5.	2	3.5	3.5	94.7
33-35	6.	1	1.8	1.8	96.5
36-38	7.	2	3.5	3.5	100.0
TOTAL		57	100.0	100.0	





# AGE AGE OF RESPONDENT IN YEARS

CODE

1. \*\*\*\*\* ( 23)  
18-20

2. \*\*\*\*\* ( 18)  
21-23

3. \*\*\*\*\* ( 10)  
24-26

4. \*\*\*\*\* ( 1)  
27-29

5. \*\*\*\*\* ( 2)  
30-32

6. \*\*\*\*\* ( 1)  
33-35

7. \*\*\*\*\* ( 2)  
36-38

.....10.....20.....30.....40.....50  
FREQUENCY

MEAN	2.158	STD ERR	0.194	MEDIAN	1.806
MODE	1.000	STD DEV	1.461	VARIANCE	2.135
KURTOSIS	3.396	SKEWNESS	1.816	RANGE	6.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	7.000		
VALID CASES	57	MISSING CASES	0		



SEX	SEX OF RESPONDENT					
	CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
	MALE	1.	43	75.4	75.4	75.4
	FEMALE	2.	14	24.6	24.6	100.0
		TOTAL	57	100.0	100.0	



SEX SEX OF RESPONDENT

```

CODE
1. ***** ( 43)
   I *****
   I MALE
   I *****
   I *****
2. ***** ( 14)
   I *****
   I FEMALE
   I *****
   I *****
   I .....1.....10.....1.....20.....1.....30.....1.....40.....1.....50
   0 FREQUENCY

```

MEAN	1.246	STD ERR	0.058	MEDIAN	1.163
MODE	1.000	STD DEV	0.434	VARIANCE	0.189
KURTOSIS	-0.546	SKEWNESS	1.214	RANGE	1.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	2.000		
VALID CASES	57	MISSING CASES	0		



EDUC	EDUCATION LEVEL OF RESPONDENT				RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
	CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ				
	HS OR GED	1.	22		38.6	38.6	38.6
	SOME COL OR TECH	2.	24		42.1	42.1	80.7
	TECH SCH DEGREE	3.	2		3.5	3.5	84.2
	BS OR BA	4.	7		12.3	12.3	96.5
	BS OR BA PLUS	5.	2		3.5	3.5	100.0
		TOTAL	57		100.0	100.0	





## EDUC EDUCATION LEVEL OF RESPONDENT

[illegible]



JOBTIME MONTHS ASSIGNED TO CURRENT UNIT

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
1-2	1.	30	52.6	52.6	52.6
3-4	2.	15	26.3	26.3	78.9
5-6	3.	2	3.5	3.5	82.5
9-10	5.	4	7.0	7.0	89.5
11-12	6.	1	1.8	1.8	91.2
OVER 12	7.	5	8.8	8.8	100.0
	TOTAL	57	100.0	100.0	







# NUMUNITS    NUMBER OF ASSIGNMENTS AS CI ASSISTANT

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
1	1.	57	100.0	100.0	100.0
	TOTAL	57	100.0	100.0	









PRIORSVC PRICR MILITARY SERVICE

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
YES	1.	4	7.0	7.0	7.0
NO	2.	53	93.0	93.0	100.0
	TOTAL	57	100.0	100.0	



PRIORSVC PRIOR MILITARY SERVICE

CODE

14) 本本本

SEX

(53)

\*\*\*\*\*

ON

100  
80  
60  
40  
20  
0 FREQUENCY

109  
109

10960

801...1001

801...1001

## FREQUENCY

MEAN  
MODERATE  
KURIN

1.930  
2.000  
10.311  
1.000

1.930  
2.000  
10.311  
1.000

1.930  
2.000  
10.311  
1.000

1.930  
2.000  
10.311  
1.000

1.930  
2.000  
10.311  
1.000

1.930  
2.000  
10.311  
1.000

1.930  
2.000  
10.311  
1.000

STD ERR  
STD DEV  
SKEDNESS  
MAXIMUM

STD ERR  
STD DEV  
SKEDNESS  
MAXIMUM

STD ERR  
STD DEV  
SKEDNESS  
MAXIMUM

STD ERR  
STD DEV  
SKEDNESS  
MAXIMUM

0.034  
0.258  
3.457  
2.000

0.034  
0.258  
3.457  
2.000

0.034  
0.258  
3.457  
2.000

0.034  
0.258  
3.457  
2.000

**MEDIAN  
VARIANCE  
RANGE**

**MEDIAN  
VARIANCE  
RANGE**

**MEDIAN  
VARIANCE  
RANGE**

1.962  
1.066  
1.000

1.962  
1.066  
1.000

1.962  
1.066  
1.000

## VALID CASES

57

MISSING CASES

Q



BRANCH      BRANCH OF PRICR SERVICE

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
ARMY	1.	3	5.3	5.3	5.3
AIR FORCE	2.	1	1.8	1.8	7.0
NCT APPLICABLE	3.	53	93.0	93.0	100.0
	TOTAL	57	100.0	100.0	









SOURCINF INITIAL SOURCE OF MOS INFORMATION

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
LOCAL RECRUITER	1.	15	26.3	26.8	26.8
AFEEs	2.	33	57.9	58.9	85.7
FRIEND	3.	5	8.8	8.5	94.6
USAICS AND TRANS	4.	3	5.3	5.4	100.0
	0.	1	1.8	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		57	100.0	100.0	







REGIONFM RECRUITING REGION ENLISTED

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
WEST	1.	8	14.0	14.0	14.0
SOUTHWEST	2.	5	8.8	8.8	22.8
MIDWEST	3.	18	31.6	31.6	54.4
NORTHEAST	4.	21	36.8	36.8	91.2
SOUTHEAST	5.	5	8.8	8.8	100.0
TOTAL		57	100.0	100.0	









# RECINFO ACCURACY OF RECRUITING DATA

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
PART ACCURATE	2.	31	54.4	56.4	56.4
COMP INACC	3.	22	38.6	40.0	96.4
CAN NOT RECALL	4.	2	3.5	3.6	100.0
	0.	2	3.5	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	57	100.0	100.0	



## RECINFO ACCURACY OF RECRUITING DATA

CODE

2. I \*\*\*\*\* ( 31)

2. I PART ACCURATE

3. I \*\*\*\*\*( 22)

CCMP INACC

4. I\*\*\* ( 2) I CAN NOT RECALL

CAN NOT RECALL

0.\*\*\* (21)

(MISSING)

FREQUENCY

0  
10  
20  
30  
40  
50

**FREQUENCY**

MEAN	2.473	STD ERR	0.077	MEDIAN	2.387
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.573	VARIANCE	0.328
KURTOSIS	-0.455	SKEWNESS	0.724	RANGE	2.000

# MODE KURTOSIS

KURTOSIS  
MINIMUM

MINIMUM

	VALID CASES	MISSING CASES	2
--	-------------	---------------	---



INFOPROV RECRUITER PRESENTED THE MOS DATA

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
VERBALLY	1.	11	19.3	20.4	20.4
	2.	20	35.1	37.0	57.4
REG AND VERBAL	3.	15	26.3	27.8	85.2
PAM AND VERBALLY	4.	6	10.5	11.1	96.3
REGULATION	5.	2	3.5	3.7	100.0
PAMPHLET	0.	3	5.3	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		57	100.0	100.0	





INFORMED RECRUITER PRESENTED THE MOS DATA

CODE

1.	***** ( 11) VERBALLY	***** ( 20)
2.	***** REG AND VERBAL	***** ( 15)
3.	***** PAM AND VERBALLY	***** ( 6)
4.	***** ( 2) PAMPHLET	***** ( 3)
5.	***** ( 3) (MISSING)	***** ( 4)
		***** ( 8)
		***** ( 12)
		***** ( 16)
		***** ( 20)

MEAN	2.407	STD ERR	0.144	MEDIAN	2.300
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	1.055	VARIANCE	1.114
KURTOSIS	-0.206	SKEWNESS	0.503	RANGE	4.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	5.000		
VALID CASES	54	MISSING CASES	3		



# CONTRACT ENLISTMENT CONTRACT OF RESPONDENT WAS

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
COMP ACCURATE	1.	4	7.0	7.3	7.3
INACCURATE	2.	51	89.5	92.7	100.0
	0.	2	3.5	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		57	100.0	100.0	







# ASSIGNF RECRUITER DATA ON POSSIBLE ASSIGNMENTS

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
TACTICAL	1.	4	7.0	7.0	7.0
NON-TACTICAL	2.	3	5.3	5.3	12.3
CIVILIAN CLOTHES	3.	33	57.9	57.9	70.2
NONE PROVIDED	4.	16	28.1	28.1	98.2
TAC OR CIVILIAN	5.	1	1.8	1.8	100.0
	TOTAL	57	100.0	100.0	





## ASSIGNING RECRUITER DATA ON POSSIBLE ASSIGNMENTS

[illegible]



RSNENL	REASON FOR ENLISTING IN ARMY							
CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)			
SECURITY	1.	4	7.0	7.0	7.0			
SATISFACTION	2.	21	36.8	36.8	43.9			
EDUC BENEFITS	3.	21	36.8	36.8	80.7			
SEC AND SAT	4.	2	3.5	3.5	84.2			
SAT AND EDUC	5.	3	5.3	5.3	89.5			
SEC SAT AND EDUC	6.	2	3.5	3.5	93.0			
EXPERIMENT	7.	1	1.8	1.8	94.7			
PATRIOTISM	8.	3	5.3	5.3	100.0			
	TOTAL	57	100.0	100.0				



REASON FOR ENLISTING IN ARMY

[illegible]



SELMOS REASCN FOR SELECTING 97B10 MOS

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
INTEREST	1.	15	26.3	26.8	26.8
FOR CIVILIAN JOB	2.	17	29.8	30.4	57.1
BEST AVAIL	3.	20	35.1	35.7	92.9
INTEREST AND CIV	4.	3	5.3	5.4	98.2
FRIEND INFLUENCE	5.	1	1.8	1.8	100.0
	0.	1	1.8	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		57	100.0	100.0	





# SUMOS

CODE

MEAN  
MODE  
KURTOSIS  
MINIMUM



RECDATA RECRUITER DATA GIVEN WAS BEST AVAILABLE

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
STRONGLY AGREE	1.	8	14.0	14.3	14.3
	2.	23	40.4	41.1	55.4
NO OPINION	3.	11	19.3	19.6	75.0
	4.	9	15.8	16.1	91.1
STRONG DISAGREE	5.	5	8.8	8.9	100.0
	0.	1	1.8	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		57	100.0	100.0	



## RECDATA RECRUITER DATA GIVEN WAS BEST AVAILABLE

CODE

1. I \*\*\*\*\* ( 8 )  
I \*\*\*\*\* STRONGLY AGREE

2. I AGREE ( 23)

3. \*\*\*\*\* ( 11 )  
I \*\*\*\*\* NO OPINION

4. I \*\*\*\*\* ( 9)  
I CISAGREE

5. \*\*\*\*\* ( 5 )  
I STRONG DISAGREE

(MISSING) 0. I \*\* ( 1)

1  
0  
FREQUENCY

MEAN	2.643	STD ERR	0.158	MEDIAN	2.370
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	1.182	VARIANCE	1.397
KURTOSIS	-0.603	SKEWNESS	0.535	RANGE	4.000

VALID CASES	MISSING CASES	1
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SCHENTRY UPCN ARRIVAL AT SCHOOL RESPONDENT

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
ENTERED 10 CLASS	1.	2	3.5	3.5	3.5
SIGNED WAIVER	2.	28	45.1	49.1	52.6
INVALID ACTION	3.	7	12.3	12.3	64.9
RECLASS ACTION	4.	4	7.0	7.0	71.9
USAICS TRANSFER	5.	6	10.5	10.5	82.5
AGENT COURSE	6.	8	14.0	14.0	96.5
NO WAIVER SIGNED	7.	2	3.5	3.5	100.0
TOTAL		57	100.0	100.0	





SSCHENTRY UPCK ARRIVAL AT SCHOCL RESPNDENT

CODE

[illegible][illegible]



COURSE COURSE ATTENDED AT USAICS

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
CI ASSISTANT	1.	33	57.9	57.9	57.9
FM 20 TO 10 CRS	2.	14	24.6	24.6	82.5
RECYCLE 10 TC 10	3.	2	3.5	3.5	86.0
AGENT COURSE	4.	8	14.0	14.0	100.0
	TOTAL	57	100.0	100.0	



## COURSE ATTENDED AT USAICS

CODE

I \*\*\*\*\* ( 33 )  
1. I CI ASSISTANT

2. I \*\*\*\*\* ( 14)  
I FM 20 TO 10 CRS

3. \*\*\* (2) I RECYCLE 10 TO 10

4. \*\*\*\*\* ( 8 )  
I AGENT COURSE

FREQUENCY

0  
10  
20  
30  
40  
50

MEAN	1.737	STD ERR	0.141	MEDIAN	1.364
MODE	1.000	STD DEV	1.061	VARIANCE	1.126
KURTOSIS	0.356	SKEWNESS	1.298	RANGE	3.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	4.000		
VALID CASES	57	MISSING CASES	0		



# SCHJOBIN JOB DESCRIPTION AT SCHOOL VS RECRUITER

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSCLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
COMP AGREE	1.	3	5.3	5.6	5.6
PART AGREE	2.	21	36.8	38.9	44.4
COMP DIFFERENT	3.	28	49.1	51.9	96.3
NONE GIVEN	4.	2	3.5	3.7	100.0
	0.	3	5.3	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	57	100.0	100.0	









SCMOSKN SCHOOL AWARE CF UNIT TASKS PERFORMED

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSCLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
STRONGLY AGREE	1.	7	12.3	12.7	12.7
AGREE	2.	12	21.1	21.8	34.5
NO OPINION	3.	4	7.0	7.3	41.8
DISAGREE	4.	18	31.6	32.7	74.5
STRONG DISAGREE	5.	14	24.6	25.5	100.0
	0.	2	3.5	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		57	100.0	100.0	







# SCHPREP PREPARATION FOR JOB SCHOOL PROVIDED

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
SATISFACTORY	1.	21	36.8	39.6	39.6
MARGINAL SAT	2.	17	29.8	32.1	71.7
LESS THAN SAT	3.	11	19.3	20.8	92.5
UNSAT	4.	4	7.0	7.5	100.0
	0.	4	7.0	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		57	100.0	100.0	





SCHPREP PREPARATION FOR JOB SCHOOL PROVIDED

CODE

1. \*\*\*\*\* ( 21 )

2. \*\*\*\*\*(17)

3. I \*\*\*\*\*  
I \*\*\*\*\*  
LESS THAN SAT (SAT

4. \*\*\*\* ( 4 )  
I UNSAT

(MISSING) I \*\*\*\* ( 4 )

FREQUENCY

0  
10  
20  
30  
40  
50

MEAN	1.962	STD ERR	0.132	MEDIAN	1.824
MODE	1.000	STD DEV	0.960	VARIANCE	0.922
KURTOSIS	-0.647	SKEWNESS	0.620	RANGE	3.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	4.000		
VALID CASES	53	MISSING CASES	4		



# BESTPREP BEST TASK TRAINED FOR AT SCHOOL

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSCLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
ENEMY COL ASSETS	1.	8	14.0	15.7	15.7
OPSEC	2.	17	29.8	33.3	49.0
CI INSPEC AND SVYS	3.	7	12.3	13.7	62.7
1,2,3 AND RPTS	5.	6	10.5	11.8	74.5
EN ASSETS-OPSEC	6.	1	1.8	2.0	76.5
1,2 AND 3 ABCVE	7.	5	8.8	9.8	86.3
OPSEC-INSPEC	8.	4	7.0	7.8	94.1
NONE	9.	3	5.3	5.9	100.0
	0.	6	10.5	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		57	100.0	100.0	



## BESTPREP BEST TASK TRAINED FOR AT SCHOOL

[illegible]



# INSTQUAL QUALITY OF SCHOOL INSTRUCTION

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSCLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
EXCELLENT	1.	17	29.8	31.5	31.5
GOOD	2.	27	47.4	50.0	81.5
FAIR	3.	9	15.8	16.7	98.1
POOR	4.	1	1.8	1.9	100.0
	0.	3	5.3	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		57	100.0	100.0	









# INSTCHG    RECOMMENDED CHANGE IN INSTRUCTION

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
MORE TAC CI	1.	9	15.8	30.0	30.0
MORE TRAD CI	2.	10	17.5	33.3	63.3
HIGHER STANDARDS	3.	4	7.0	13.3	76.7
SCH ID FLD NEEDS	4.	2	3.5	6.7	83.3
MORE HANDS-ON	5.	3	5.3	10.0	93.3
DELETE ARMY STRU	6.	1	1.8	3.3	96.7
INCLUDE 20 TNG	7.	1	1.8	3.3	100.0
	0.	27	47.4	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		57	100.0	100.0	



# INSTCHG

CODE

1. I \*\*\*\*\* ( CI 9)

2. \*\*\*\*\* ( 10)  
I MORE TRAD CI

3. \*\*\*\*\* (4) FIFTH STANDARDS

4. I\*\*\* ( 2) SCH ID FLD NEEDS

5. \*\*\* ( 3 ) I MORE HANDS-ON

6. I I ( I ) CELETE ARMY STRU

7. \*\* ( 1 )  
I INCLUDE 20 TNG

0. ( 27 )

1  
0  
FREQUENCY

MEAN	2.567	STD ERR	0.302	MEDIAN	2.100
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	1.654	VARIANCE	2.737
KURTOSIS	0.595	SKEWNESS	1.147	RANGE	6.000

VALID CASES	30	MISSING CASES	27
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CURPOSTN CURRENT UNIT MOS POSITION ASSIGNED

CATEGORY LABEL	CCODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
97B POSITION	1.	48	84.2	90.6	90.6
MI MOS NOT 97B	2.	3	5.3	5.7	96.2
NON-MI MOS	3.	2	3.5	3.8	100.0
	0.	4	7.0	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		57	100.0	100.0	





## CURPOSTN CURRENT UNIT MCS POSITION ASSIGNED

CODE

(48)

1. I 57B POSITION

2. I \*\*\* ( MOS NOT 3) 97B

3. I \*\*\* ( 21  
NCA-MI MOS

(MISSING) I \*\*\*\* ( 4 )

FREQUENCY

10  
20  
30  
40  
50

MEAN	1.132	STD ERR	0.060	MEDIAN	1.052
MODE	1.000	STD DEV	0.440	VARIANCE	0.194
KURTOSIS	11.804	SKEWNESS	3.488	RANGE	2.000

	VALID CASES	MISSING CASES	
	53	4	



CURUNIT CURRENT UNIT OF ASSIGNMENT

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSCLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
CBT ARMS DIV-BDE	1.	4	7.0	7.4	7.4
MI GROUP	2.	4	7.0	7.4	14.8
MI BN	3.	31	54.4	57.4	72.2
MI CO-DET	4.	13	22.8	24.1	96.3
MIL ASSIST CNTR	5.	1	1.8	1.9	98.1
CORPS HQS	6.	1	1.8	1.9	100.0
	0.	3	5.3	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		57	100.0	100.0	



**CURRENT UNIT OF ASSIGNMENT**

CODE

1. I \*\*\*\* ( 4 )  
I CBT ARMS DIV-BDE

2. I M I GROUP ( 4)

3. \*\*\*\*\* ( 31)

4. I \*\*\*\*\* ( 13 )  
I MI CO-DET

5. I\*\* I ( MIL ASSIST CNTR

6. I CRPS HQS 11

(MISSING) I \*\*\*\* ( 3)

1  
0  
FREQUENCY

MEAN	3.111	STD ERR	0.126	MEDIAN	3.113
MODE	3.000	STD DEV	0.525	VARIANCE	0.855
KURTOSIS	1.907	SKEWNESS	-0.079	RANGE	5.000

VALID CASES	54	MISSING CASES	3
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# MAJORITY OF DUTY DAY SPENT ACCOMPLISHING

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
OPSEC	1.	3	5.3	5.7	5.7
CI INSP-SURVEYS	2.	1	1.8	1.9	7.5
MCS-SOLD TNG	3.	18	31.6	34.0	41.5
GARRISON DUTY	4.	16	28.1	30.2	71.7
SOLD TNG ONLY	5.	1	1.8	1.9	73.6
MCS-SOLD TNG-GAR	6.	2	3.5	3.8	77.4
OPSEC-CI INS-SVY	7.	12	21.1	22.6	100.0
	0.	4	7.0	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		57	100.0	100.0	









# UNITINFO DUTIES OF MOS EXPLAINED BY SUPERVISORS

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
STRONGLY AGREE	1.	3	5.3	5.6	5.6
	2.	17	29.8	31.5	37.0
NO OPINION	3.	9	15.8	16.7	53.7
	4.	15	26.3	27.8	81.5
STRONG DISAGREE	5.	10	17.5	18.5	100.0
	0.	3	5.3	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		57	100.0	100.0	



## UNITINFO DUTIES OF MOS EXPLAINED BY SUPERVISORS

CODE	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	0.	MEAN	MODE	KURTOSIS	MINIMUM	VALID CASES	STD ERR	STD DEV	SKWENESS	MAXIMUM	MISSING CASES	3	MEDIAN	VARIANCE	RANGE	3.278	1.535	4.000
	1. ***** ( 3 ) STRONGLY AGREE	2. ***** ( 17 ) AGREE	3. ***** ( 9 ) NO OPINION	4. ***** ( 15 ) DISAGREE	5. ***** ( 10 ) STRONG DISAGREE	0. ***** ( 3 ) (MISSING)	3.222	2.000	-1.235	1.000	54	0.169	1.239	-0.008	5.000	3							
	1. ***** ( 3 ) STRONGLY AGREE	2. ***** ( 17 ) AGREE	3. ***** ( 9 ) NO OPINION	4. ***** ( 15 ) DISAGREE	5. ***** ( 10 ) STRONG DISAGREE	0. ***** ( 3 ) (MISSING)	3.222	2.000	-1.235	1.000	54	0.169	1.239	-0.008	5.000	3							



# SUPKNLDG SUPERVISOR KNOWLEDGE OF 97B10 DUTIES

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSCLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
STRONGLY AGREE	1.	5	8.8	9.3	9.3
AGREE	2.	20	35.1	37.0	46.3
NO OPINION	3.	7	12.3	13.0	59.3
DISAGREE	4.	14	24.6	25.5	85.2
STRONG DISAGREE	5.	8	14.0	14.8	100.0
	0.	3	5.3	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		57	100.0	100.0	









FREQTASK MOST FREQUENT MOS TASK PERFORMED

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
CI INSPEC-SURVEY	1.	5	8.8	10.4	10.4
OPSEC	2.	15	26.3	31.3	41.7
TRAIN OTHER UNIT	3.	4	7.0	8.3	50.0
ASSIST 20S	4.	1	1.8	2.1	52.1
PSI ADMIN	5.	1	1.8	2.1	54.2
CI INS-SVY-CPSEC	6.	6	10.5	12.5	66.7
LITTLE TO NONE	7.	13	22.8	27.1	93.8
1,2 AND 3 ABOVE	8.	3	5.3	6.3	100.0
	0.	9	15.8	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	57	100.0	100.0	



[illegible][illegible]



TRANSJOB RELATION OF TASKS TO TRAINING

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
HIGHLY RELATED	1.	9	15.8	17.0	17.0
SOMEWHAT RELATED	2.	21	36.8	39.6	56.6
NO OPINION	3.	6	10.5	11.3	67.9
MINIMALLY RELATE	4.	13	22.8	24.5	92.5
NOT RELATED	5.	4	7.0	7.5	100.0
	0.	4	7.0	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	57	100.0	100.0	





## TRNVSJOB RELATION OF TASKS TO TRAINING

[illegible]

MEAN	2.660	STD ERR	0.170	MEDIAN	2.333
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	1.239	VARIANCE	1.536
KURTOSIS	-1.039	SKEWNESS	0.372	RANGE	4.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	5.000		
VALID CASES	53	MISSING CASES	4		



# NEDTRAIN AREA ADDITIONAL TRAINING IS NEEDED

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
NONE NEEDED	1.	1	1.8	5.0	5.0
TRAD CI	2.	8	14.0	40.0	45.0
GARRI-MOTOR FCCL	3.	9	15.8	45.0	90.0
PREP OF TRAIN	4.	2	3.5	10.0	100.0
	0.	37	64.9	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	57	100.0	100.0	



**NEDTRAIN AREA ADDITIONAL TRAINING IS NEEDED**

[illegible]



SUPIMPOR IMPCPTANCE SUPERVISOR PLACES ON 97B10

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
VERY IMPORTANT	1.	13	22.8	23.6	23.6
	2.	14	24.6	25.5	49.1
NO OPINION	3.	16	28.1	29.1	78.2
UNIMPORTANT	4.	11	19.3	20.0	98.2
VERY UNIMPORTANT	5.	1	1.8	1.8	100.0
	0.	2	3.5	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		57	100.0	100.0	









# SATWDUTY SATISFIED WITH MOS DUTIES PERFORMED

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSCLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
STRONGLY AGREE	1.	4	7.0	7.1	7.1
	2.	11	19.3	19.6	26.8
	3.	14	24.6	25.0	51.8
NO OPINION					
DISAGREE	4.	14	24.6	25.0	76.8
	5.	13	22.8	23.2	100.0
STRONG DISAGREE	0.	1	1.8	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	57	100.0	100.0	







# JOBCHALG MOS DUTIES PERFORMED ARE CHALLENGING

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSCLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
STRONGLY AGREE	1.	5	8.8	8.8	8.8
AGREE	2.	17	29.8	29.8	38.6
NO OPINION	3.	12	21.1	21.1	59.6
DISAGREE	4.	14	24.6	24.6	84.2
STRONG DISAGREE	5.	9	15.8	15.8	100.0
	TOTAL	57	100.0	100.0	









# UNITTRNG TRAINING RECEIVED IN UNIT IS

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSCLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
MOS ONLY	1.	5	8.8	8.9	8.9
SCLD ONLY	2.	6	10.5	10.7	19.6
BALANCE MCS-SCLD	3.	37	64.9	66.1	85.7
MIN MOS-SOLD	4.	8	14.0	14.2	100.0
	0.	1	1.8	MISSING	100.0
	TCTAL	57	100.0	100.0	







# TRAINMAT AVAILABILITY CF TRAINING MATERIALS

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSCLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
OUTSTANDING	1.	3	5.3	5.4	5.4
	2.	4	7.0	7.1	12.5
EXCELLENT	3.	19	33.3	33.9	46.4
GOOD	4.	14	24.6	25.0	71.4
FAIR	5.	16	28.1	28.6	100.0
POOR	0.	1	1.8	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		57	100.0	100.0	









# HRSTRAIN AVERAGE HOURS PER WEEK CF MCS TRAINING

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSCLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
0-1	1.	19	33.3	33.9	33.9
2-6	2.	24	42.1	42.9	76.8
7-11	3.	2	3.5	3.6	80.4
12-16	4.	6	10.5	10.7	91.1
OVER 16	5.	5	8.8	8.9	100.0
	0.	1	1.8	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	57	100.0	100.0	







SELFIMP IMPCRTANCE RESPONDENT PLACES CN MOS

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
STRONGLY AGREE	1.	17	29.8	30.4	30.4
AGREE	2.	19	33.3	33.9	64.3
NO OPINION	3.	9	15.8	16.1	80.4
DISAGREE	4.	8	14.0	14.3	94.6
STRONG DISAGREE	5.	3	5.3	5.4	100.0
	0.	1	1.8	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	57	100.0	100.0	









# LVLTRAIN TASKS PERFORMED COMPARED TC TRAINING

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSCLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
BEYOND TRAIN	1.	18	31.6	35.3	35.3
EXACTLY TRAIN	2.	4	7.0	7.8	43.1
BELOW TRAIN	3.	29	50.9	56.9	100.0
	0.	6	10.5	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	57	100.0	100.0	







FOLUPINF FOLLOW UP MOS DATA GIVEN BY SUPERVISOR

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
AGREE	1.	26	45.6	47.3	47.3
DISAGREE	2.	29	50.9	52.7	100.0
	0.	2	3.5	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	57	100.0	100.0	









# CAREEROP ALL SCHOOL AND CAREER OPTICNS EXPLAINED

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSCLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
AGREE	1.	15	26.3	27.3	27.3
ONLY CAREER	2.	3	5.3	5.5	32.7
SL2 CAREER-SCH	4.	15	26.3	27.3	60.0
NONE DISCUSSED	5.	22	38.6	40.0	100.0
	0.	2	3.5	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		57	100.0	100.0	



# CAREEROP ALL SCHOOL AND CAREER OPTICNS EXPLAINED

[illegible]



COWRKIMP IMPCRTANCE CO-WORKERS PLACE ON 57B10

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSCLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
IMPORTANT	1.	19	33.3	34.5	34.5
UNIMPORTANT	2.	15	26.3	27.3	61.8
NO OPINION	3.	19	33.3	34.5	96.4
NO CO-WORKERS	4.	2	3.5	3.6	100.0
	0.	2	3.5	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		57	100.0	100.0	









SATWUNIT SATISFIED WITH UNIT CF ASSIGNMENT

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
STRONGLY AGREE	1.	3	5.3	5.3	5.3
AGREE	2.	11	19.3	19.3	24.6
NO OPINION	3.	14	24.6	24.6	49.1
DISAGREE	4.	13	22.8	22.8	71.9
STRONG DISAGREE	5.	16	28.1	28.1	100.0
	TOTAL	57	100.0	100.0	



SATWUNIT SATISFIED WITH UNIT CF ASSIGNMENT

CODE

1. I \*\*\*\*\* ( 3)  
I STRONGLY AGREE

2. I AGREE \*\*\*\*\* ( 11)

3. I \*\*\*\*\* ( 14 )  
I NO OPINION

4. I \*\*\*\*\* ( 13)

5. I STRONG DISAGREE ( 16)

1  
0  
FREQUENCY

MEAN	3.491	STD ERR	0.164	MEDIAN	3.538
MODE	5.000	DEV	1.241	VARIANCE	1.540
KURTOSIS	-1.035	SKEDNESS	-0.270	RANGE	4.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	5.000		
VALID CASES	57	MISSING CASES	0		



SATWLOC      SATISFIED WITH GEOGRAPHIC AREA

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSCLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
STRONGLY AGREE	1.	14	24.6	24.6	24.6
AGREE	2.	16	28.1	28.1	52.6
NO OPINION	3.	11	19.3	19.3	71.9
DISAGREE	4.	9	15.8	15.8	87.7
STRONG DISAGREE	5.	7	12.3	12.3	100.0
	TOTAL	57	100.0	100.0	









SATWMO5 SATISFIED WITH DUTIES OF 97B10

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
STRONGLY AGREE	1.	5	8.8	8.8	8.8
AGREE	2.	11	19.3	19.3	28.1
NO OPINION	3.	12	21.1	21.1	49.1
DISAGREE	4.	14	24.6	24.6	73.7
STRONG DISAGREE	5.	15	26.3	26.3	100.0
	TOTAL	57	100.0	100.0	







SELECTAG RESPONDENT WOULD SELECT SAME MOS AGAIN						
CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)	
CURRENT MOS	1.	21	36.8	38.2	38.2	
ANOTHER MI MCS	2.	4	7.0	7.3	45.5	
NON-MI MOS	3.	15	26.3	27.3	72.7	
NOT ENLIST	4.	15	26.3	27.3	100.0	
	0.	2	3.5	MISSING	100.0	
	TOTAL	57	100.0	100.0		









REUP                      RESPONDENT INTENTION FOR REENLISTMENT

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
CURRENT MOS	1.	14	24.6	25.0	25.0
OTHER MI MOS	2.	2	3.5	3.6	28.6
NON-MI MOS	3.	4	7.0	7.1	35.7
UNDECIDED	4.	17	29.8	30.4	66.1
ETS DUE TO MCS	5.	12	21.1	21.4	87.5
ETS OTHER RSNS	6.	7	12.3	12.5	100.0
	0.	1	1.8	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		57	100.0	100.0	



# REUP

CODE

NE  
EA  
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X  
M



COMMENTS RESPONDENT PROVIDED ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
YES	1.	38	66.7	67.9	67.9
NO	2.	18	31.6	32.1	100.0
	0.	1	1.8	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	57	100.0	100.0	









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